COMMENT
TAX INCENTIVES AS STATE ACTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of tax incentives 1 as legislative devices to implement
social and economic policy has recently become the subject of
intense debate among economists, government agencies and
legal scholars. This debate has focused primarily upon the comparative success and desirability of tax incentives as contrasted
with other forms of government assistance designed to effectuate
similar policy goals.' Two major issues have been most frequently argued: whether tax incentives can be considered
In the course of the debate over the use of tax provisions to effectuate public
policy, certain key terms have taken on rather specific definitions. This Comment will
adhere essentially to the definitions of "tax expenditure" and "tax incentive" set out b
Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison wit
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706-07 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Tax Incentives]:
those special provisions of the federal income tax system which represent
government expenditures made through that system to achieve various social
and economic objectives. These special provisions provide deductions, credits,
exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and preferential rates, and serve ends similar
in nature to those served by direct government expenditures or loan programs
...(and thus they serve ends) other than measurement of net income under an
income tax.
The phrase "and other than the measurement of property value under a property tax"
should be added to the end of the definition. Tax expenditures discussed in this
Comment are intended to include both income and property tax provisions enaded by
local, state or federal governments. The meaning of "tax incentive" will be: "a tax
expenditure which induces certain activities or behavior in response to the monetary
benefit available." Id. 711.
2 It should be noted at the outset that this Comment does not advocate any particular
position in this dispute, but is concerned strictly with the constitutionality ot tax incentives. However, the debate has generated a vast amount of valuable information which is
extremely useful in illuminating the constitutional issue. For outstanding work done
recently in the field, see C. KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(1960); TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY (1972); TAX
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES (1971); Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a
Goal ofIncome Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Bittker, Accountingfor Federal
"Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT. TAX J. 244 (1969); Bittker, Churches, Taxes
and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 128 5 (1969); Blum, FederalIncome Tax Reform-Twenty
Questions, 41 TAXES 672 (1963); Kurtz, Tax Incentives: Their Use and Misuse, 20 U. So. CAL.
1968 TAX INST. 1; McDaniel, Alternatives to Utilization of the FederalIncome Tax System to
Meet Social Problems, 11 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 867 (1970); McDaniel, FederalMatching
Grantsfo r CharitableContributions:A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REv.
377 (1972); McDaniel & Kaplinsky, The Use f the FederalIncome Tax System to Combat Air
and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 351
(1971); Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 912 (1966);
Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for a
National Policy, 20 U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX INST. 27; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reforms: The
Varied Apoaches Necessafy to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct GovernmentalAssistance, 84
HARV. IL-REV. 352 (1970); Tax Incentives, supra note 1; Taussig, Economic Aspects of the
Personal Income Tax Treatment of CharitableContributions,20 NAT. TAX J. 1 (1967); Warren,
Krattenmaker & Snyder, Property Tax Exemptions for Charitable, Educational,Religious and
Governmental Institutions in Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REv. 181 (1971); Wolfman, Federal Tax
Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (1965); Note, FederalTax Benefits to
Segregated Private Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 922 (1968).
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economically equivalent to government expenditures and other
subsidies; and what should be the degree of public and legislative
review of tax incentives as compared to that accorded alternative
forms of government assistance. Although criticism of tax incentives has been diverse and far-reaching, 3 the debate has seldom
reached the question whether tax incentives are constitutionally
equivalent to government expenditures and other subsidies, requiring the same degree of constitutional review as has tradition4
ally been afforded these other forms of government assistance.
The recent case of McGlotten v. Connally5 dealt directly with
the constitutional issue. It evoked in response one of the first
scholarly attempts 6 to meet the question, an article coauthored
by Professor Boris I. Bittker and Kenneth M. Kaufman,7 in
which the authors severely criticize the McGlotten opinion of
Judge Bazelon.
In McGlotten, the Secretary of the Treasury was enjoined
from granting tax exemptions8 to racially discriminatory fraternal organizations, and from permitting donors to those organiza-

' Some have suggested that tax incentives are an undesirable form of government
assistance because they are insulated from the extensive public and legislative examination ordinarily encountered by grants, loans and interest subsidies. In the absence of such
regular legislative review, it is argued, tax incentives tend to outlive their usefulness and
survive in the tax codes as concealed subsidies. Another criticism of tax incentives is that
once they have been enacted, they enjoy a presumption of legislative approval. If a
particular tax incentive is to be reduced or eliminated, the burden is on its opponents to
persuade the legislature, say the critics. Other commentators have claimed that government control over activities supported by tax incentives is inadequate, and that the cost of
tax incentives to the government is unpredictable and frequently openended. See sources
cited note 2 supra. One tax incentive in particular, the charitable deduction, has been
criticized for favoring taxpayers in the higher income brackets, and thus violating two
fundamental objectives o income taxation-equity and progressivity. See Vickrey, One
Economist's View of Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC POLICY 31 (F. Dickinson ed.
1962). Also, for an example of extraordinary recommendations by a representative of a
charitable organization, see the report of Alan Pifer, President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York: Pifer, Revitalizing the CharitableDeduction, in 1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK [characterizing the federal income tax
deduction as a provision that drastically needs to be "more democratic"].
4 A most notable exception is the commentary dealing with the constitutionality of
tax incentives granted to private segregated schools. See, e.g., U.S. COwa'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, Legal Implications of Federal tax Benefits to Racially Segregated Private Schools, in
SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 142 (1967); Silberblatt, Denial of Tax
Exempt Status to Southern Segregated Academies, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 179
(1970); Spratt, Federal Tax Exemption forPrivate Segregated Schools: The CrumblingFoundation, 12 Vm. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated Private
Schools, 68 COLUNi. L. REV. 922 (1968); Note, The Validity of Tax Benefits to Private
Segregated Schools, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1410 (1970). Many of these articles were written in
response to Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mer. sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), and Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970), sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S.
986 (1971).
- 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
6 For other commentaries on the fraternal order cases see Note, The Internal Revenue
Code and Racial Discrimination, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1972); Note, Granting of Tax
Benefits to DiscriminatoryFraternalOrders is a Violation of the Equal ProtectionAspect o the Fifth
Amendment, 18 VILL. L. REv. 93 (1972).
7 Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing"the Internal Revenue
Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Taxes and Civil Rights].
8 INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 501(c)(8).
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tions to deduct their contributions. 9 One of the three independent grounds for the injunctive relief granted was that such tax
incentives violate the equal protection clause, 10 because they
constitute significant government subsidies supporting and encouraging racial discrimination. McGlotten is one of several recent
decisions in the lower federal courts" which have held that the
government subsidies resulting from the granting of federal or
state tax incentives to private organizations can be sufficient to
transform the otherwise private discrimination practiced by
those organizations into "state action" subject to the prohibitions
of the equal protection clause. Prior to these cases, direct grants
from the state and federal governments had been virtually the
only form of government subsidy to discriminatory private organizations which had been invalidated by the courts.
Tax incentives have seldom been singled out to be tested as
a form of government subsidy to private discrimination, although courts have examined the constitutionality of tax incentives as one element in a composite pattern of government
involvement with private discrimination.' 2 McGlotten and its
companion cases are therefore significant for having introduced
a revolutionary concept into constitutional law: that tax incentives, like other forms of government assistance, are subject to
the requirements of the Constitution, and may not be utilized to
9Id. § 170(c)(4).
10 The fifth amendment's due process clause has been held to impose a duty upon
the federal government similar to that required of the states by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5
(1973) & sources cited; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection:Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499,
1502 n.24 (1971).
" See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543 (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 1973);
Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed,
93 S. Ct. 907 (1973); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
Cf. Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States aycees, No. 73-C-66 (N.D. Okla., Jun.
26, 1973); McCoy v. Shultz, Civ. No. 1580-72 (D.D.C., Feb. 13, 1973).
12 The question whether tax incentives are capable of activating the equal protection
clause was first resolved in Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis.
1971). Prior to this decision, the mere granting of tax incentives had been held
insufficient to violate the first amendment establishment clause in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1969), and inadequate to activate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969). There have
been numerous cases holding that tax incentives, as part of an overall pattern of
government involvement, do not suffice to activate constitutional restrictions. See Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); ChicagoJoint Board, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 973 (1971); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 343 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1972),
vacated & remanded, 447 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382
(N.D. Ind. 1970), aft'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,
299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. 541 (1949).
There have also been cases holding tax incentives part of a composite scheme of
government involvement with private activity sufficient to subject that activity to constitutional scrutiny. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Holmes v.
Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F.
Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd men., 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
921 (1968); Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
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support and encourage private discrimination in violation of the
equal protection clause.
-In Taxes and Civil Rights, Bittker and Kaufman express

strong reservations regarding this novel constitutional principle,
and offer a five point criticism of McGlotten. First, they contend
that McGlotten failed to apply properly the approach formulated13
by the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority

to guide lower federal courts in making case-by-case determinations whether a particular government involvement with private
discrimination is so substantial as to constitute state action under
the fourteenth amendment: "Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance."' 4 Bittker and
Kaufman contend that the McGlotten analysis would apply
equally to all fraternal orders without regard to their size, the
extent or location of their facilities, the nature and scope of their
activities, and other differentiating characteristics. This
inflexibility, they argue, is incompatible with the language and
spirit of Burton, which encouraged courts to consider a wide
range of factors in resolving the issue of state action.
Second, Bittker and Kaufman attack what they perceive to
be the "core of the constitutional holding in McGlotten"'5 : the
assumption that tax incentives are capable of being distinguished
from tax provisions which serve to define income, and that these
tax incentives should be considered government subsidies. They
deny that it is possible to arrive at any universally acceptable
ideal concept of income, denouncing the Haig-Simons
definition16 generally accepted by those who believe that tax
incentives can be distinguished from income-defining tax provisions. They suggest also that if tax incentives can be identified,
the exemption enjoyed by fraternal orders might not be a tax
incentive, but merely a provision intended to simplify and reduce the cost of administering the Internal Revenue Code.
Congress might have concluded that computing and recording
the income of fraternal organizations would be too burdensome
and costly to warrant taxing them. Lastly, Bittker and Kaufman
assert that the McGlotten court was inconsistent in applying its
own theory, since it failed to treat the social club exemption of
section 501(c)(7) identically with the fraternal order exemption
of section 501(c)(8). This inconsistency, they claim, undermines
the validity of the McGlotten tax subsidy theory.
The third criticism of McGlotten presented by Bittker and
Kaufman questions the wisdom of the "chosen instrumentality
13 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14Id. at 722.

15 Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 62.
" See note 190 infra & accompanying text.
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theory."' 7 According to Bittker and Kaufman, under McGlotten
only those tax incentives aimed at "particular organizations with
particular purposes"'18 will convert the otherwise private discrimination practiced by their recipients into unlawful state action; across-the-board' 9 tax incentives create no constitutional
obligations for their recipients. Bittker and Kaufman attempt to
demonstrate the arbitrariness of this distinction by applying the
theory to section 167(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, an
across-the-board provision granting a deduction for the rehabilitation of low-income rental housing. They argue that section
167(k) is unobjectionable under the McGlotten test, yet is more
obviously an incentive to private activity than section 170(c)(4);
therefore the theory is arbitrary.
Fourth, the authors of Taxes and Civil Rights assert that the
McGlotten opinion erroneously characterizes the role of tax incentives in private discrimination as one of approval. They
contend that the government's role is actually far less active.2 0
And finally, Bittker and Kaufman contend that tax incentives are
so widespread that almost every private activity in the United
States would be subjected to constitutional restrictions if tax
incentives were characterized as significant government involvement in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Many of the points raised in Taxes and Civil Rights are sound
and persuasive. However, it is quite difficult to unite them in a
coherent conclusion regarding the role of the constitution in
granting tax incentives. The article concludes on a cautionary
note:
If full sway is given to the McGlotten theory that tax
allowances are equivalent to direct grants of public
funds and hence impose constitutional obligations on
the recipient, no one will be immune . . . .[T]he tax
subsidy theory-whether in an unadulterated form or
as watered down by McGlotten-turns on technical
niceties of tax law that are unrelated to the impact of
the organization's behavior on the persons excluded by
its membership rules or other restrictive practices. It
would, therefore, be a mistake to use this theory to
"constitutionalize" the Internal Revenue Code. 2 '
" Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 73.

18338 F. Supp. at 459.
9

1 1d.

20 Bittker and Kaufman contend that the government's role is less active than

approval because: (1) a ruling or determination letter from the Internal Revenue Service
is not a prerequisite to deductibility of contributions, (2) Service rulings and determination letters are furnished to several types of taxpayers besides nonprofit organizations,
and (3) no § 501(c)(7) fraternal orders are listed in the Treasurys Cumuiative List of
Exempt Organizations.They conclude that granting tax incentives should not be considered
approval for purposes of constitutional analysis.
21 Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 86-87.
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Several meanings might be inferred from Taxes and Civil
Rights. The authors might have been warning against blind
acceptance of the theory that tax incentives are functionally
equivalent to other means of government assistance designed to
stimulate private activity in furtherance of government policies.
Acceptance of such a theory will necessarily lead to the conclusion, they believe, that all tax incentives will impose constitutional
restrictions upon their recipients, ignoring the possibility that
under the flexible Burton approach some tax incentives-as well
as some direct grants, loans and interest subsidies-will be
deemed too insignificant to activate constitutional restrictions.
Alternatively, perhaps Bittker and Kaufman intended to
deny that the Internal Revenue Code can be "constitutionalized,"
because the flaws which they perceive in the tax subsidy theory
are so severe that tax incentives can never serve to transform
private discrimination into unconstitutional state action. This
second conclusion is equally unacceptable. Legislatures have demonstrated the ease with which alternative programs can be
tailored to accomplish exactly the same objectives-one employing tax incentives, the other direct grants. 2 In such a situation,
there is no logical reason to find state action in one program, but
not in the other. In fact, such a result would encourage legislatures to employ tax provisions to accomplish objectives known to
be impermissible if pursued under a direct expenditure scheme.
Governments at the federal, state and.local levels could continue
allocating billions of dollars23 annually in tax incentives without
any constitutional review. A more acceptable conclusion, which
Bittker and Kaufman may have intended, is that the Internal
Revenue Code is capable of being "constitutionalized," but that
the court in McGlotten simply failed to devise an adequate analytical framework within which to approach the concept of state
action.
This Comment proposes such an analytical framework,
which draws heavily from both McGlotten and Taxes and Civil
Rights. This proposed framework is an attempt to devise a
comprehensive scheme for the application of constitutional restrictions to all forms of government involvement with private
conduct, including tax incentives. By contrasting the divergent
guidelines which have been evolved with respect to these
clauses, an analytical framework can be formulated that is
capable of governing the application of constitutional restrictions
to most government involvement with private conduct.
In Section II of the Comment, the economic nature of tax
text accompanying' notes'71-75 infra.
The federal government alone allocates over $47 billion annually in tax incentives.
The aggregate amount of tax incentives granted annually by state and local governments
has yet to be measured.
22 See
23
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benefits2 4 is examined and compared with the economic nature
of direct government expenditures; it is concluded that tax
benefits are functional equivalents of direct expenditures. Section III outlines an analytical framework to govern the application of constitutional restrictions to tax incentives. The concluding section questions whether tax incentives2 5 can be logically
and meaningfully isolated from other tax benefits. It is concluded that tax incentives should be defined to be those tax
provisions which are not intended to define income or property
value. Finally, the consitutional analysis developed in the preceding sections is applied to particular tax incentives to discern
whether their operation should activate constitutional restric,?
tions.
II.

THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF TAX BENEFITS

2 6

-

FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE TO
DIRECT EXPENDITURES

From a strictly economic perspective, tax benefits can be
viewed as functional equivalents of direct expenditures of government funds. This section of the Comment will compare tax
benefits with direct government expenditures solely in terms of
functional economic impact. A discussion of the constitutional
impact of tax benefits will follow in Section IV.
The allocation of government expenditures and the collection of taxes by the state 27 are interdependent halves of a single
fiscal process. Revenue is gathered in the form of taxes and
distributed through a variety of government expenditures.
There is no significant difference in economic impact between a
legislative decision that a particular entity should receive a direct
government grant of a certain amount, and one that it should be
relieved of its otherwise payable tax burden by that amount. This
proposition is accurate for all three basic varieties of tax
benefits--exemptions, deductions and credits.
24 For the definition of "tax benefit" used in this Comment, see note 26 infra.
25 Compare the definition of "tax incentive," note 1 supra, with the definition of tax

benefit, note 26 infra. The distinction between the two, which is essential to the central
argument presented in this Comment, is developed more fully in Section IV infra.
26 The term "tax benefit" used here includes every tax provision which provides
taxpayers with advantageous tax treatment. As used in this Comment, the term is broad
enough to include all exemptions, deductions and credits, including those which will later
be seen to be "true" income or property value defining provisions. In Taxes and Civil
Rights, Bittker and Kaufman use the term "tax allowances" similarly, to describe a class of
tax provisions broad enough to include both tax subsidies and true income defining
rovisions, as they were distinguished in McGlotten. Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at
Since this section compares only the functional economic impact of tax benefits with
that of direct expenditures, a discussion of legislative objectives and other factors
germane to a determination of the constitutionality of tax benefits is not appropriate
here. These issues will be discussed in Section IV infra.
27 The term "state" as used herein includes federal, state and local governments. The
taxes discussed include property, income, gift and estate taxes collected at any of these
levels of government.
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By granting a tax exemption to a particular entity, the
legislature relieves that entity of the taxpaying obligation borne
by others. The legislature could accomplish an equivalent fiscal
result by including the entity within the tax base, taxing it
directly and then granting it a subsidy equal to the tax it paid;
this direct expenditure alternative differs from the tax exemption only in that both the tax base and total governmental
expenditures have increased by the amount of the tax paid by
the entity.
A deduction also produces an economic result similar to that
produced by a direct expenditure. The government, by allowing
individual taxpayers to decrease their taxable income through
deductions, permits them to allocate funds which would otherwise be collected as tax. The recipient of these funds thus
becomes the beneficiary of government largesse. This scheme of
private allocation of public resources has frequently been characterized as a "matching grant" system, authorizing private taxpayers to channel funds which are partially earmarked for government collection.
Tax credits are the tax benefit structurally most similar to
direct government expenditures. A tax credit is a reimbursement
credited to a taxpayer by the government, reducing the total tax
paid by that taxpayer. Tax credits are more closely analogous to
direct government expenditures than tax deductions because the
full amount of a credit, but only a percentage of a deduction,
constitutes government funds.
Endorsements of the theory that tax benefits are functionally equivalent to direct government spending have come from
most scholars and theorists who have dealt with the issue,2 8 as
well as from various levels of the executive and legislative
29
branches of government. Proponents include state legislatures;
28

See, e.g., sources cited note 2 supra; J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT 152 (1965); Aaron, Federal Encouragement of Private Giving, in TAX
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY, 210, 211 (1972); Korbel, Do

Federal Income Tax Laws Involve an "Establishment of Religion"?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1018, 1019
(1967),; McDaniel, Discussion of Support of Private PhilanthropyThrough FederalIncome Tax
Laws, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY, 220, 227 (1972);

Taubman & Rasche, The Income Tax and Real Estate Investment, in TAX INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES, 113 (1971); Vickrey, supra note 3, at 33; Note, The Internal
Revenue Code and Racial Discrimination, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1219 (1972).
19 A joint committee of the New York Legislature wrote a report which is cited in
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN
STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX 85 (1963): "Tax exemption does give a subsidy, but
the trouble is that it is a blind subsidy, controlled by accident. And it is, moreover, a
compulsory subsidy which cannot be reviewed and fixed by those who pay it as sound
finance demands."
TEMPORARY COMMISSION TO STUDY THE TAX LAWS OF THE STATE AND TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THEIR REVISION, REPORT 242 (Conn. 1934) is cited in

Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, Property Tax Exemptions for Charitable, Educational,
Religions and Governmental Institutions in Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REv. 181, 306 (1971):
Exemption from taxation is a bounty or subsidy. There would be less difficulty if
all exemptions were abolished and public assistance to worthy activities were
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the Internal Revenue Service 30 and other sources within the
Treasury Department, including an Assistant Secretary of the
32
Treasury for Tax Policy 3 ' and a Secretary of the Treasury;

congressional committees; 33 a presidential commission; 34 a prominent congressman; 35 and a former President. 3 6 There has been
made by the General Assembly in the form of outright grants, bounties or
subsidies. But because of tradition, the vested interests attaching to existing
exemptions and prevailing public sentiment, such a solution of the problem is at
?0resent only of academic interest.
A former assistant chief counsel of the Internal Revenue Service described the
economic function of a tax exemption as follows:
Where the object of an exemption, which here is income, is of a character which
is subject to tax, the effect is to save the beneficiaries of the exemption from tax
at the expense of individuals who are taxed. From the standpoint of people and
their principles of government, such inequality is not equity in taxation.
Moreover, it differs only in method from a disbursement of government funds.
Reiling, What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 529, 595 (1958) (emphasis
added).
31 In a speech given in 1967, Stanley Surrey, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy, suggested that
through deliberate departures from accepted concepts of net income and
through various special exemptions, deductions and credits, our tax system does
operate to affect the private economy in ways that are usually accomplished by
expenditures-in effect to produce an expenditure system described in tax
language.
Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to ProfessorBittker, 22 NAT. TAX

J. 528 (1969).

32 Subsequent to the Surrey speech just cited, the Treasury Department included a
report on tax expenditures in the Fiscal 1968 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Surrey & Hellmuth, supra note 31, at 529. Secretary Joseph Barr presented the study
before the Joint Economic Committee in January of 1969, including in his remarks the
following statement: "Through special provisions in the tax system, similar in effect to
appropriations, we are now making available huge sums of money to various functional
sectors of the budget." Hearings on the 1969 Economic Report of the PresidentBefore the Joint
Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). The Treasury repeated this tax
expenditure analysis the following year, and the Joint Economic Committee has subsequently urged that the tax expenditure approach be employed in drawing up the Federal
budget. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax
Expenditures With Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REv. 352, 355 (1970).
Finally, the staffs of the Treasury Department and the joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation have prepared a report for the House Committee on Ways and Means
entitled Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, which covers the fiscal year 1971.
3 The Joint Committee conducted a study of federal tax policy for economic growth
and stability, in which Walter Blum pointed out the disadvantages
"subsidyBudget,
by way 22
of
thea National
inof
tax preference." See Bittker, Accounting for Federal"Tax Subsidies"
NAT. TAX J. 244 (1969). Walter W. 1Heller, testifying before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, discussed the hidden nature of government spending through tax
incentives:
The back door to government subsidies marked 'tax relief' is easier to push open
than the front door marked "expenditures" or the side door marked "loans,
guarantees, and insurance." . . . [H]ere is a whole catacombs of Government
benefits which are largely hidden from public view, let alone, periodic review.
Heller, Some Observations on the Role and Reform of the Federal Income Tax, in HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM

181,

190 (1959).

" In a study on property taxes, the President's Advisory Commission on Inter-

governmental Relations concluded that the exemption for nonprofit religious, charitable
and educational institutions "adds up to a large, concealed government subsidy for
numerous classes of nonprofit institutions and organizations.... No nationwide data are
available, however, on the value of these indirect subsidies." ADVISORY COMrSSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS,

THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING

THE

PROPERTYTAX 84 (1963).
3-Congressman Wilbur Mills has referred to special tax relief as "back-door spending" and "indirect subsidy." 113 Cong. Rec. 16,890 (daily ed., Dec. 13, 1967), cited in 22
NAT. TAX J. 244, 245 (1969).
36 EcoNoMIc

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 18 (Jan. 1966), cited in Stone, Federal Tax
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discussion in the courts as well of the issue of the functional
economic equivalence of tax benefits and direct expenditures.37
Most lower federal courts which have explicitly considered the
functional equivalence theory have adopted it.3 8 In Green v.
Kennedy,39 the Internal Revenue Service was enjoined from
granting tax exempt status to private schools which were racially
segregated. The impact of section 170 of the Internal Revenue
Code was described in Green as a "matching grant. ' 40 In Green v.
Connally,4 1 tax benefits to the same schools were analyzed in the
following terms: "[T]ax exemptions and deductions certainly
constitute a Federal Government benefit and support. While that
support is indirect, and is in the nature of a matching grant
rather than an unconditional grant ....
The court in Pitts v.
Department of Revenue4 3 enjoined the granting of Wisconsin state
income and property tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
fraternal organizations. These tax benefits were viewed as providing those organizations with "indirect financial aid. '4 4 McGlotten held that "there is no question that allowing the deduction of
charitable contributions in fact confers a benefit on the organization receiving the contribution, '45 and reiterated the Green
characterization of tax deductions as "matching grants"; 46 and a
unanimous three-judge decision in Wolman v. Kosydar 47 invalidated a scheme of tax credits to parents of children in Ohio
parochial schools as violative of the establishment clause, explicitly adopting the functional equivalence theory: "We think
that the law is clear that tax exemptions, deductions and credits,
like reimbursement grants, are all benefits conferred by the
state .. "48
The Supreme Court also appears to have adopted the functional equivalence theory. In Griffin v. School Board,4 9 the Court
",

Support o Charities and Other Exempt Organizations:The Need for a NationalPolicy, 20 U. So.
CAL. 1968 TAx INST. 27, 32.

37 Discussion of the case law in this area from a constitutional viewpoint will be
postponed to Section IV, infra.
I The functional equivalence theory, however, was not explicitly considered in
either McCoy v. Shultz, Civ. No. 1580-72 (D.D.C., Feb. 13, 1973), or Junior Chamber of
Commerce v. United States Jaycees, No. 73-C-66 (N.D. Okla., Jun. 26, 1973).
State courts have been less uniform in their treatment of the functional equivalence
theory. See, e.g., Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 386, 161 A.2d 770, 776-77
(1960); Murray-v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 399, 216 A.2d 897, 906
(1966) (holding tax benefits equivalent to direct grants). But see Traverse City School Dist.
v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 391, 429, 185 N.W.2d 9, 26 (1971).
9 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956 40
(1970), sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
Id. at 1136.
441
2 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
1Id. at 1164.
4' 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
44 Id. at 660.
45 338 F. Supp. at 456 n.37.
46
1d.

47 Civ. No. 72-222 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 29, 1972).
4"Id. at 14-15.
49377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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upheld a district court's injunction restraining county officials
from enforcing two ordinances which gave government aid to
private, racially segregated schools. One ordinance provided
private school students with tuition grants, and the other allowed
parents property tax credits for contributions made to nbnsectarian private schools. The district court held that both forms of
government assistance to private segregated schools violated the
equal protection clause. 5 ° Although the Fourth Circuit reversed
the lower court's decision on the ground that it should have
abstained from deciding the case on the merits, 51 the court of
appeals took note of the impact of the more than $56,000 paid
out by the county under the tax credit ordinance:
The allowance of such tax credits appears to be an
indirect method of channeling public funds to the
Foundation [operating the private segregated schools].
... The allowance of such tax credits makes uncertain
the completeness of the County's withdrawal from the
school business. It might lead to a contention that exclusion of5 2Negroes by schools of the Foundation is county
action.
The Supreme Court's opinion, written by Justice Black, reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and approved the district
court's holding:
The injunction against paying tuition grants and giving
tax credits while public schools remain closed is appropriate and necessary since those grants and tax credits
have been essential parts of the county's program, successful thus far, to deprive petitioners of the same
advantages of a public school education enjoyed by
children in every other part of Virginia.55
The Court upheld the injunction against both tax credits and
direct grants, treating them as equivalent forms of government
assistance to racially discriminatory private schools.
Subsequently, Walz v. Tax Commission 54 gave rise to uncertainty as to the Court's willingness to adopt fully the functional
equivalence reasoning. Although the Court characterized the
New York property tax exemption for religious and other
55
charitable organizations as an "indirect economic benefit,
eight Justices specifically disagreed with Justice Douglas' charac50 Allen v. County School Board, 198 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1961).

"Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963).
5Id. at 339.
53377 U.S. at 233.
54 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
55Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
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terization of a tax exemption as a subsidy. 5 6 This uncertainty
appears to have been resolved in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,5 7 in which the Court invalidated a
New York statute that provided both tax benefits and direct
grants to parents of students in private schools. The Court found
a "practical similarity" 58 when it compared the two forms of
government assistance to private schools, concluding that "[i]n
practical terms there would appear to be little difference, for
purposes of determining whether such aid has the effect of
advancing religion, between the tax benefit allowed here and the
tuition grant allowed [in another portion of the statute]." 5 9 Five
other Justices joined Justice Douglas in Nyquist in equating a tax
exemption with a subsidy. Thus, as a matter of economics, the
Court appears to have acquiesced in the functional equivalence
theory.
Although Bittker and Kaufman do not specifically deny the
functional equivalence of tax benefits and direct subsidies, they
imply that the theory is unsound. 60 The basis for their reasoning
is found in the Walz opinion. 6 1 But, as stated above, such a
reading of Walz now has been severely undermined by the
Court's opinion in Nyquist. It now seems beyond contention that
tax benefits will continue to be recognized as functional
economic equivalents of direct government expenditures.
III.

GOVERNMENT

INVOLVEMENT

WITH

PRIVATE CONDUCT

Although all tax benefits confer economic subsidies on their
recipients, the process of allocating these subsidies may differ so
significantly from the process of allocating direct expenditures
that these economically equivalent measures differ in constitutional significance. Additionally, important differences may exist
among the various types of tax benefits themselves, instilling
them with disparate constitutional consequences. Thus, the constitutional significance of tax benefits can only be determined
after a complete analysis of the facts and circumstances of the
resulting government involvement in private affairs.
The departure points for the construction of a theoretical
framework for the application of constitutional restrictions to tax
incentives and other forms of government involvement with
private conduct are the broad standards set forth by the Su6

Id.
57
93
58
Id.
9Id.
" See
61

Id.

at 709 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
S. Ct. 2955 (1973).
at 2976.
at 2974.
Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 63 n.37.
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preme Court in Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority62 for equal
63
protection and due process claims, and in Lemon v. Kurtzman
for claims under the establishment of religion clause of the first
amendment. In Burton the Court observed that "private conduct
abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its4
manifestations has been found to have become involved in it."6
The Court suggested that government involvement should be
deemed significant if
the State has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the private discriminator] that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be
considered to have been so "purely private" as to 6fall
5
without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the Court deliberately declined to spell out a more specific
standard, explaining: "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance. 6 6
In Lemon v. Kurtzman the Court enunciated a three-pronged
test for determing the constitutionality of government involvement with religious organizations: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [;]
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. ' 67 The Lemon test is essentially a
sifting and weighing test like the Burton test.
Although the vagueness of the two standards has allowed
the courts a degree of flexibility that is essential for the evaluation of the multitude of relationships that arise between government and private conduct, it has also fostered considerable
uncertainty. It is the purpose of this section to move beyond the
broad guidelines of Burton and Lemon, toward a comprehensive
set of standards for determining in a given situation whether the
government is sufficiently involved with an otherwise private
entity to activate constitutional restrictions. No simple formula
will be produced, but an attempt will be made to lay out the
factors involved in such a determination and weigh their
significance. The inquiry entails a consideration of four elements: the nature and degree of government involvement with
62365 U.S. 715 (1961).

63403 U.S. 602 (1971).
64 365 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 722.
67 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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the otherwise private entity; the nexus between the government
involvement and the challenged private activity; the nature of
the conduct engaged in by the private entity-that is, the "privateness" or "publicness" of the conduct; and the nature of the
consitutional claim-that is, whether the conduct is alleged to
violate rights of equal protection, of due process or of religion.
A.

The Nature and Degree of Government Involvement

An evaluation of the nature and degree of government
involvement in challenged private conduct hinges upon several
closely related questions: whether there is government approval
or control of the private entity and its activities; the relative
quantitative significance of government assistance, as compared
to the other resources of the entity; and whether the government
involvement provides some part of what this Comment will call
the "basic package" of government benefits.
1. Government Approval
The guarantees of freedom of religion, due process and
equal protection impose restrictions on the objectives and
methods to which the government may lend its "power, property
and prestige. '6 8 Affirmative government approval of private
conduct is clearly one sort of government action which these
guarantees may proscribe under appropriate circumstances.
The difficult question is what constitutes a stamp of government approval. Certain governmental activities have already
been held insufficient to constitute impermissible approval of
private discrimination-notably, granting liquor licenses 69 and
legislative charters. 70 Other government activities, including the
granting of tax incentives, entail varying degrees of government
approval, which may or may not justify a finding that the
government has placed its imprimatur on the conduct in question. Although a full discussion of the degree of government
approval that accompanies particular tax incentives will be deferred to Section IV, it is useful at this point to offer some general
observations.
It has been argued that tax incentives involve significantly
less government approval of private conduct than direct
expenditures"7Direct expenditure programs, it is said, are usu88 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 725. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970), it was government "sponsorship" of religious activities that the
Court looked for.
69 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
70 Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972).
7 The argument may have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). See text accompanying notes 168-70 infra. But see
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ally accompanied by detailed and stringent restrictions upon the
activities of private recipients, whereas tax incentives are typically
granted without regard to the policies of their beneficiaries.
Although federal grants, in particular, often require recipients to
certify that they do not discriminate, tax incentives frequently
impose only minimal restrictions upon the activities of their
recipients-such as the vague requirement that they engage in
"charitable activities."
While this may be true in general, it is important to note that
the difference in the degree of government approval which
might appear between tax incentives and direct expenditures is
not a function of any intrinsic difference in the processes by
which or the conditions upon which these subsidies are
granted.7 2 Tax incentive schemes run the gamut from the broad
charitable deduction to the carefully tailored tax credits and
deductions struck down in Griffin v. School Board73 and Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.74 The Griffin
and Nyquist schemes were designed with a degree of specificity
and restrictiveness comparable to most direct expenditure programs. Indeed, they were more restrictive than some direct expenditure programs-for example, G.I. Bill payments, veterans'
housing subsidies, social security benefits, civil service benefits
and the payment of government salaries. The stamp of government approval does not attach automatically to the activities of
the recipients of direct government expenditures,7 5 nor is it
necessarily withheld from activities which are aided by government tax incentives.
Several courts have explicitly acknowledged the possibility
that government approval may accompany tax incentives. For
example, the McGlotten court described the effect of Internal
Revenue Service determinations of eligibility for the section 170
deduction and the section 501 exemption as follows: "Thus the
government has marked certain organizations as 'Government
Approved' with the result that such organizations may solicit funds
from the general public on the basis of that approval. 7 6 Similarly, the district court in Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2955, 2976
(1973).
72See Tax Incentives, supra note 1, at 716-18.
73377 U.S. 218 (1964). See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
7493 S. Ct. 2955 (1973).
75In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Nyquist, Chief Justice Burger said:
There are at present many forms of government assistance to individuals that
can be used to serve religious ends, such as social security benefits or "G.I. Bill"
payments, which are not subject to nonreligious use restrictions. Yet, I certainly
doubt that today's majority would hold those statutes unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause.
93 S. Ct. at 2991-92.
76 338 F. Supp. at 456.
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concluded that Oregon, by granting a charitable exemption,
"places its stamp of approval on the Elks Lodge as an organiza77
tion that furthers the legislative policy of the State.
The essence of the concept of government approval is the
impression that the government action creates among the public.
Eligibility for favorable tax treatment certainly implies government approval in some sense, but does not necessarily imply
approval of all conduct engaged in by the favored entity. Thus,
for example, the public may interpret the granting of tax exempt
status to a racially discriminatory school not as an indication of
government approval of the discrimination, but simply as an
indication that the school passed some red-tape test which took
no account of the school's racial policies. The former brand of
approval would clearly be of greater significance to a determination whether the discrimination can be termed state action. In
each case, therefore, we should not inquire simply whether or
not a tax incentive or other government benefit indicates government approval of an entity in some sense, but to what aspects
of the favored entity's activities that approval extends in the
public's view.
2. Government Regulation
The concept of government control over or regulation of an
entity's activities is closely related to the concept of government
approval. Government control over. an activity, like approval,
may affect the extent to which that activity partakes of the
government's "power, property and prestige.17 8 Not surpris-

ingly, control and approval often go hand in hand.
The conclusion reached with respect to the relative degrees
of government approval inherent in tax incentives and direct
expenditures is equally applicable to the relative degrees of
control inherent in them: while legislatures have often chosen to
fashion tax incentives with few strings attached, there is nothing
inherent in a tax incentive which prevents the government from
exercising the same degree of control over tax-favored activities
that it exercises over activities favored by direct government
expenditures. Each tax incentive scheme, like each expenditure
program, must be subjected to individual scrutiny.
A line of cases dealing with private hospitals receiving federal grants under the Hill-Burton Act serves to illustrate the
operation of government control and regulation in transforming
private conduct into constitutionally prohibited conduct, in both
"350 F. SuP'P' 887, 889 (D. Ore. 1972). See also Green v. Kene y,-109 Fii.-p-p.
1127, 1135 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970), sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
78 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 725.
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the due process and the equal protection settings. Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital7 9 held that private hospitals
participating in the Hill-Burton program were bound by the
equal protection clause under Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.8 0 The significant aspects of government identified in
Simkins were the "massive use of public funds,' 's8 the public
function performed by the hospitals, and the "elaborate and
intricate pattern of governmental regulations, both state and
federal.18 2 The regulations enforced by an agency of the state
provided in detail for all aspects of the management of the
hospitals-administration, clinical services, auxiliary services,
nursing services and food services. In the words of the Fourth
Circuit in another Hill-Burton case, in which the court found
state action in the activities of a hospital which received no
Hill-Burton funds but which was nevertheless subject to the
Hill-Burton regulations, the regulations "effectively controll[ed]
the full range of day-to-day hospital administration and
operation. 8' 3 The degree of control exercised by the state and
federal governments under the Hill-Burton Act, combined with
the other factors mentioned in Simkins, resulted in findings of
state action in the operation of hospitals in a number of due
process and equal protection
cases involving varying degrees of
84
government funding.

3. Quantitative Significance of Government Assistance
An evaluation of the degree to which private activity is
supported by the government's "power, property and prestige,"
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
80 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
81 323 F.2d at 967.
82
Id. at 964-65, 967-68.
83 Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964). The hospital did receive city
and county construction funds and a tax exemption.
11 Courts found state action in the following cases involving due process claims:
Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971) (Hill-Burton funds
accounted for 8% of the hospital's operating budget, and county funds accounted for
6%); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971)
(funding not specified); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir.
1969) (Hill-Burton funds covered about one-third of the cost of one construction project
and one-half the cost of another); Meredith v. Allen County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n,
397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968) (funding not specified); Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313
F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (Hill-Burton funds covered about one-third of construction
79

costs).

Courts found state action in the following cases involving racial discrimination:
Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.
1967) ($2,250,000 in Hill-Burton funds); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses,
360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966) ($1.7 million in Hill-Burton funds).
A district court, in a free exercise case, found state action in the operation of a
hospital which was not alleged to have received Hill-Burton funds, but which was subject
to a "system of pervasive regulation" similar to that in Simkins. Holmes v. Silver Cross
Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 133 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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or is imbued with government "sponsorship," 85 necessarily entails an inquiry into the significance of the government assistance
in relation to the total amount of resources consumed by the
activity.8 6 This inquiry has been undertaken frequently by the
courts, and has resulted in determinations that no state action
existed in the following disparate circimstances: when government funds comprised 4 % of a private hospital's total operating budget; 87 when the net advantage of a state property tax
exemption to a private university amounted to .82% of the
university's costs; 8 8 when a private college received 3% public
funding;8 9 and when a school was operated with 23% public
funds. 90 Under this quantum theory, state action was found with
respect to a library that received 99% of its operating budget
from a municipal government. 9 1
A few courts have criticized the tendency to use a quantum
analysis as the exclusive index of state action. In the Hill-Burton
cases, the courts found constitutional violations, despite the fact
that government expenditures were an extremely small percentage of the operating budget of private hospitals. 92 And in
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University,93 the court wrote that
receipt of money from the State is not, without a good
deal more, enough to make the recipient an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Otherwise, all kinds
of contractors and enterprises, increasingly dependent
upon government business for much larger proportions
of income than those here in question, would find
themselves charged with "state action" in the performance of all kinds of functions we still consider and
treat as essentially "private" for all presently relevant
purposes.
But the percentage of government resources utilized by private
entitities is nonetheless a significant aspect of government involvement. As Judge Wisdom suggested in Poindexterv. Louisiana
FinancialAssistance Commission: "Where there is no evidence of
purposeful participation in private
discrimination, the percen'9 4
tage of state aid is relevant.
" Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
" The quantum theory is thoroughly discussed in Note, Federal Tax Benefits to
Segregated Prvate Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 922, 929-30 (1968).
"IEaton v. Board of James Walker Mem. Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958). For
subsequent litigation concerning this hospital, see note 83 supra & accompanying text;
text accompanying notes 149-50 infra.
11Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
89 Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
90 Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
91 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
92
See note 84 supra.
9 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
9' 275 F. Supp. 833,. 855 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
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The "Basic Package" of Government Benefits and Services

The last significant inquiry into the nature and degree of
government involvement is whether that involvement takes the
form of provision of part of the "basic package" of government
benefits. The recent Supreme Court decisions in Norwood v.
Harrison9" and Nyquist seem to suggest that there is such a basic
package of government-furnished benefits and services that does
not carry with it constitutional restrictions. The composition of
that basic package of benefits and services has by no means been
defined, but the Norwood and Nyquist decisions offer some
noteworthy observations. In Norwood, the Court stated:
We do not suggest that a State violates its constitutional
duty merely because it has provided any form of state
service that benefits private schools said to be racially
discriminatory. Textbooks are a basic educational tool
and, like tuition grants, they are provided only in connection with schools; they are to be distinguished from
generalized services government might provide to
schools in common with others. Moreover, the textbooks provided to private school students by the State in
this case are a form of assistance readily available from
sources entirely independent of the State .... The State
has neither an absolute nor operating monopoly on the
procurement of school textbooks;
anyone can purchase
96
them on the open market.
Nyquist offered a similar, but not identical, statement in the
establishment-of-religion context:
Such services [police and fire protection, sewage disposal, highways and sidewalks], provided in common to
all citizens, are "so separate and so indusputably marked
off from the religious function,". . . that they may fairly
be viewed as reflections of a neutral posture toward
religious institutions . .
. The Court [in Board of
Education v. Allen] repeatedly emphasized that ... there
was no indication that textbooks would be provided
for
97
anything other than purely secular courses.
Three criteria for the determination of the content of the
basic package emerge from these two statements. First, in Nyquist
the Court found significance in the fact that the benefits were
separate from the religious function of the school. It is no simple
matter to determine whether a benefit is clearly separate from
95 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973).
96
d. at 2810-11.
97 93 S. Ct. at 2970.
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the religious function of a religious school. Any benefit will free
funds for expenditure on matters directly related to its religious
function. The Nyquist criterion of separateness of function is,
therefore, of limited use in defining, in the establishment of
religion context, the contents of the basic package of government
benefits. After Norwood any related criterion is simply irrelevant
98
in the equal protection context.
Second, the Norwood Court focused on whether the state had
"an absolute or operating" monoply on the distribution of the
particular benefit. The concept of government monopoly on the
distribution of a particular benefit is a useful one. 99 But the
language quoted above should not be read to mean that only
benefits and services available exclusively from the government
should be considered elements of the basic package. Postal
service, for example, is available from private sources, but would
clearly be part of the basic package of government benefits and
services. The Norwood language should be read for the proposition that a benefit or service that is "readily available"'10 0 from the
government and that is generally obtained from the government
rather than from private sources is a likely candidate for inclusion in the basic package that will not activate constitutional
restrictions.' 0 '
Third, both Norwood and Nyquist found that distribution to a
wide range of people was a distinguishing feature of the elements of the basic package. Norwood spoke of services that the
government provides to schools in common with others; but the
Nyquist language referring to services provided in common to all
citizens provides a more suitable definition of the basic package.
Certainly the fact that the state may provide textbooks to libraries and day care centers, in addition to schools, would not
throw the provision of textbooks into the basic package. The
government can single out several entities as well as it can single
98
Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (provision of textbooks to
private sectarian schools does not violate the establishment clause), with Norwood v.
Harrison, 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973) (provision of textbooks to a private discriminatory school
violates the equal protection guarantee).
99 The Norwood notion of government monopoly is consonant with the cases which

have held that private conduct is not transformed into impermissible state action by the
granting of legislative charters and liquor licenses. Corporation charters, marriage and
driver's licenses, and building permits would also fall into this category.
100 Text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
101 It might be argued-that since tax incentives

are available only from the government, all tax incentives fall within the basic package. But thi argument fails for 2
reasons. First, exclusive distribution by the government may not by itself place a benefit
within the basic package. Second, and more importantly, the relevant inquiry in the case
of tax incentives is whether the economic benefit provided by the government through
the tax incentive is of the sort provided exclusively by the government, not whether E
tax incentive itself can only be provided by the government. In fact, a tax incentive would
rarely, if ever, meet the Norwood monopoly standard, for the benefit provided through
tax incentives is a general monetary one which could presumably be supplied through
numerous other channels.
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out one entity, and the basic package should consist of benefits
that are so widely available that no entity or entities can be
considered to be singled out.
It might be suggested that the government may pay for
whatever it requires a private entity to do, without activating
constitutional restrictions-that is, that government assistance
which helps a private entity to conform to state-imposed regulations, such as requirement of minimum lighting or sanitary
facilities in a school, falls within the basic package of government
benefits and services. But the Court explicitly rejected this contention in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty,' °2 an establishment of religion case. Since what constitutes state action for purposes of the establishment clause does
not necessarily constitute state action for purposes of the equal
protection clause,' 0 3 the Levitt principle does not necessarily
apply in cases of discrimination. But the question whether the
activity made possible by the government assistance is required
by the government does not seem particularly pertinent to the
inquiry which underlies the determination of the contents of the
basic package-namely, whether the government involvement is
of a kind that cannot be seen as offering support for a particular
entity and its activities.
While no comprehensive definition of the basic package has
emerged from this brief discussion, the second and third criteria
drawn from the Norwood and Nyquist opinions can be combined
to form a broad definition suitable for purposes of this Comment. The basic package of government benefits and services,
the provision of which does not activate constitutional restrictions, consists of those benefits and services which are generally
provided by the government rather than by private entities, and
which, when provided by the government, are available to the
public at large.
B.

The Nexus Between the Government Involvement
and the Challenged Private Action

The government is involved, in one way or another, with a
vast number of private entities, and a wide range of different
activities. Once it is concluded that government involvement with
an otherwise private entity is capable of transforming some of
the activities of that entity into state action, the obvious question
becomes which of these activities can be so transformed.
Judge Friendly offered some observations on the requisite
connection between the government involvement and the chal93 S. Ct. 2814, 2819-20 (1973).
"'See note 98 supra; text accompanying notes 163-69 infra.
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lenged activity in Powe v. Miles.10 4 In that case, the Second
Circuit held that Alfred University's establishment and enforcement of demonstration guidelines constituted state action with
respect to students in the entirely state-supported New York
State College of Ceramics located on the Alfred University
campus, but did not constitute state action with respect to students in Alfred's liberal arts college, which received a small
amount of state aid. In rejecting the contention that the state's
regulation of educational standards in the university transformed the university's disciplinary policies into state action,
Judge Friendly noted:
[T]he state must be involved not simply with some
activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury
upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the
injury. Putting the point another way, the state action,
not the 1private
action, must be the subject of
05
complaint.
In other words, Powe indicates that the existence of state regulation or the imposition of state standards will not transform into
state action those activities of a private institution that are not
subject to the regulations or standards.
Financial assistance is, of course, different from regulation;
and in this regard, Judge Friendly held that the amount of state
assistance provided to the liberal arts college was "a long way
from being so dominant as to afford basis for a contention that
the state is merely utilizing private trustees to administer a state
activity."' 10 6 Although the only case cited by Judge Friendly at
this point in his opinion was a case in which the entity (a library)
was completely owned and supported from its inception by the
state,10 7 his opinion at least leaves open the possibility that partial
financial assistance could give rise to state action.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the question of the significance
of general financial assistance to a private university in Browns v.
Mitchell.'o 8 In holding that a special tax exemption did not
convert a university's disciplinary policies into state action, the
court explained that
there is nothing in the record to indicate that [the tax
exemption] is or can be utilized in any way to dictate or
influence the administration of University affairs. And
even more critically, there is no suggestion that the
claimed involvement is in any way associated with the
104 407

F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).

1'd. at 81.

06

1 Id.

107

Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).

108409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
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challenged activity . . . The benefits conferred, however characterized, have no bearing on the challenged
actions beyond the perpetuation of the institution
itself.1 0 9
Although the Browns court noted that the university received no
state funds, 1 10 the case, particularly the language quoted above,
can be read for the proposition that government financial assistance that contributes generally to the perpetuation of an entity
will not give rise to state action-that only direct state involvement with the specific challenged activity justifies a finding of
state action. Under this restrictive theory, a private foundation
that receives federal funds to operate day care facilities could
constitutionally exclude all black applicants, unless it could be
shown that the government was directly involved in the decision
to discriminate. This theory is unacceptable. The suggestion that
general financial assistance to an entity cannot transform any
specific activity of that entity into state action suffers from a
serious flaw: it incorrectly assumes that government involvement
that bears directly upon a specific activity of an entity can be
meaningfully distinguished from government involvement that
serves more generally to perpetuate that entity as a whole. It is
an inescapable fact that general government assistance which
perpetuates an entity operates indirectly to perpetuate the
specific activities of that entity. In the example of the foundation
that discriminates in making available its day care services, government financial assiatance serves to continue that discrimination.
The restrictive nexus theory that can be drawn from Browns
is at odds with the result reached by the Supreme Court in
Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority. In Burton, a discriminatory
private restaurant leased space from a parking authority in a
public garage building. The government involvement was
nonspecific, merely helping to perpetuate the restaurant as an
economically viable enterprise. There was no government involvement with the decision of the restaurant owner not to serve
black persons. Yet the Court found state action."'
In McGlotten v. Connally, 2 the district court applied a nexus
theory that was slightly less restrictive than that suggested by
Browns. McGlotten held that government involvement serving
merely to perpetuate a private entity, and not directed to any
specific activity of that entity, could be sufficient to activate the
protection clause if the private entity is one of those
"particular organizations with particular puposes" that are

-equal

09

1 Id.

at 596.

"OId. at 595.

'1 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
112 338

F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
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selected and, in effect, approved (along with their discriminatory
practices) by the government. 1 3 The McGlotten court suggested
that deductions for mortgage interest' 1 4 and accelerated depreciation for rehabilitated low income rental property, 115 while
acting as incentives, would not trigger constitutional restrictions
because, unlike charitable deductions for contributions to fraternal orders, they do not expressly choose any organizations as
vehicles. Bittker and Kaufman severely criticize this "chosen
instrumentality" theory in Taxes and Civil Rights, and there is no
16
need to elaborate upon their thorough and valid objections,
beyond repeating part of their response to the McGlotten court's
distinction between the deductions allowed by section 170 for
charitable contributions and by section 167(k) for rehabilitating
low-income rental housing:
[Section] 167(k) is more clearly in purpose, and.probably in effect, an incentive to taxpayer behavior than the
tax exemption for fraternal orders. Since the issue
under Wilmington Parking Authority is the extent of governmental encouragement of the activity that discriminates, the fact that § 167(k) was clearly intended to
increase the supply of a particular type of housing
seems to suggest that it is at least as vulnerable as §
170(c)(4), encouraging charitable contributions to fraternal orders, and more vulnerable than § 501(c)(8),
exempting the fraternal order's bwn income, for these
provisions demonstrate
no clear purpose to encourage
17
[private activity].

A better nexus theory, which would avoid some of the
problems posed by Browns and McGlotten, would focus less on the
specificity of the government involvement and more on the
particular activity undertaken by the private entity. Under this
modified nexus theory, the only private activities that could be
transformed into state action would be those undertaken by a
private entity in the normal course of accomplishing the objectives intended by the legislature to underlie the government
involvement. In the case of a tax incentive, this governmentobjective nexus theory would subject to constitutional scrutiny
only those private activities pursued by beneficiaries of the tax
incentive for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives which
the tax incentive was intended to advance.
This theory does not avoid every defect of the alternatives.
A question remains: what relation must there be between the
113 Id.

at 459.

CODE OF 1954, § 163.
167(k).
and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 68-74.
1 Id. 73.
114 INT. REV.

115
d. §
116 Taxes
17
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objective of the tax incentive and the challenged private conduct
in order to find a violation of the equal protection clause? For
example, if a private contractor who receives deductions under
section 167(k) for housing rehabilitation were to refuse to sell his
personal residence to a prospective buyer on racial grounds,
would his refusal constitute state action? What if the contractor
were to refuse to hire laborers or purchase building materials
from wholesalers on racial grounds? It could be argued that only
the contractor's refusal to rent apartments after the completion
of the project could activate constitutional sanctions. The intended beneficiaries of the tax deduction are the prospective unit
dwellers (low income citizens in need of housing), although the
contractor and his subcontractors and employees certainly derive
economic benefit from the deduction. Why, the argument goes,
should the manner in which the construction of that housing was
undertaken be of any constitutional significance? On the other
hand, one could argue that Congress intended to encourage
construction of the units by enacting the exemption, so that
construction must comply with constitutional norms. Which activities are drawn into the category of state action will depend on
their perceived relationship to carrying out the legislature's objective.
The government-objective nexus theory supports the decision of the Supreme Court in Norwood. In that case, the Court
held that the provision of free textbooks to students in private
racially discriminatory schools was state action for purposes of
the equal protection clause. The nature of the government
benefit was nonspecific: the provision of textbooks supported the
discriminatory schools by allowing them to allocate their funds
for other necessary expenditures, but it did not involve the
government directly with the decision made by the schools to
exclude blacks. The Norwood Court explained:
Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private
school students, are a form of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools themselves. An
inescapable educational cost for students in both public
and private schools is the expense of providing all
necessary learning materials. When, as here, that necessary expense is borne by the State, the economic consequence is to give aid to the enterprise; if the school
engages in discriminatory practices the State by tangible
aid in the form of textbooks
thereby gives support to
8
such discrimination.!"
In reaching its conclusion the Norwood Court rejected the
argument that the provision of textbooks could not constitute
118 93 S. Ct. at 2810.
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state action in support of discrimination because the benefit was
to the parents and the children, not to the schools. 1 9 The Nyquist
Court rejected a similar argument in the establishment-ofreligion context. 2 Both decisions are noteworthy for their willingness to look beyond the form of the government involvement
to the nature of the indirect benefit which flowed to the private
entity.
The Norwood case is unlike the Griffin and Nyquist cases, in
which the government involvement was tailored to achieve
specific objectives by attempting to circumvent prior holdings of
the Court. The Mississippi statute which authorized the textbook
program challenged in Norwood was enacted in 1940, long before
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 2 '
and "consequently, long before there was any occasion to have a
policy or reason to foster the development of racially segregated
private academies."' 2 2 The Norwood holding provides strong
support for the contention that any government benefit, including a tax incentive, which is not included in the basic package
attaches the label of state action to conduct taken in pursuit of
the objectives which the benefit was designed to serve, regardless
of the lack of legislative intent to foster discrimination or circumvent constitutional requirements.
Even under the government-objective nexus theory outlined
above, it remains necessary to determine how close a connection
there must be between the government objective and the challenged conduct. What has been offered is merely an approach to
the constitutional evaluation of the nexus between government
involvement and the challenged conduct. This approach is better
suited to the evaluation of tax incentives, which contemplate the
inducement by the government of certain kinds of conduct, than
either the restrictive Browns approach or the McGlotten chosen
instrumentality approach. And since the government-objective
nexus theory is in harmony with the Supreme Court's current
position as expressed in Norwood, the McGlotten chosen instrumentality theory, devised before Norwood, is no longer an appropriate constitutional standard for evaluating tax incentives.
C. The Nature of the Conduct Engaged
in by the Private Entity
1. Privateness
Any theoretical framework constructed to guide the application of constitutional restrictions to government involvement
"'Id. at 2810.
120 93 S. Ct. at 2969-72.
121

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

122

93 S. Ct. at 2808.
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with private conduct must take into account the constitutional
vectors which countervail the equal protection, due process and
establishment clauses-the freedoms of speech, religion and assembly. These constitutional guarantees are at the heart of the
concept of "privateness," and may in some cases operate to
forbid the denial of government benefits and services to private
entities.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the first amendment
freedom of speech prohibits the government from conditioning
benefits on the expression of a particular political belief. In
Speiser v. Randall,' 23 the Court invalidated a California statute
that required all who claimed real property tax exemptions to
sign a statement disavowing involvement with any activity advocating the violent overthrow of the government of either the
United States or the State of California. The Court distinguished
the case from others sustaining the validity of loyalty oaths
required of public employees, candidates for public office and
officers of labor unions, on the ground that in those cases "there
was no attempt directly to control speech but rather to protect,
from an evil shown to be grave, some interest clearly within the
sphere -of governmental concern."' 124 The Court held that
a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging
in speech is a limitation on free speech .... To deny an
exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its
deterrent effect is the1 same
as if the State were to fine
25
them for this speech.
The Court has also held that the free exercise clause of the
first amendment imposes restrictions on the freedom of the
government to withhold benefits. In Sherbert v. Verner,' 26 a
Seventh Day Adventist was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act, which provided that a claimant was ineligible for benefits if "he has failed without good
cause ... to accept available suitable work when offered him by
the employment office or the employer."' 2 7 The Seventh Day
Adventist was offered employment which required working
Saturday, and refused to accept it because Saturday is the sabbath day of her religion. The Supreme Court held that "to
condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
24

1 Id. at 527.
125

d. at 518.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
1271d. at 401.
126
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effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties. 128
The zone of protection offered by the first amendment
freedoms is not, however, without limits. Although the Court did
extend protection to religiously dictated conduct in Sherbert, it
drew a distinction between government regulation of religious
belief and regulation of religiously dictated conduct, indicating
that conduct may be regulated under certain circumstances:
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly
closed against any governmental regulation of religious
beliefs as such . . . . Government may neither compel
affirmation of a repugnant belief, . . . nor penalize or

discriminate against individuals or groups because they
hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities .... On
the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under
the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of
certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for "even when the action is in accord with one's
religious convictions,
[it] is not totally free from legisla12 9
tive restrictions."'

Likewise, the Court in Speiser was careful to point out that "[flor
the purposes of this case we assume without deciding that
California may deny tax exemptions to persons who engage in
the proscribed
speech for which they might be fined or
130
imprisoned."

Although speech may constitutionally be regulated under
narrow circumstances,13 1 there is in the freedom of speech
context a distinction between expression of ideas and action
taken pursuant to ideas, 32 which is similar to the distinction in
the free exercise context between religious belief and religiously
dictated conduct. This distinction between expression and action
can be illustrated by three recent lower federal court decisions.
InJoyner v. Whiting,' 33 the Fourth Circuit held that the hiring or
advertising policy of a state college newspaper would constitute
conduct in violation of the equal protection clause if students
were denied the opportunity to write for the newspaper, or if
advertisers were denied the opportunity to advertise, on racial
grounds. However, Joyner held that the advocacy by a state
college newspaper of a racist belief as editorial policy was expres1 8

2

9

Id. at 406.

2 Id. at 402-03.

" 357 U.S. at 519-20.
r" See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
31 Indeed, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Court explained that
the regulation of speech in Dennis was proper because the speakers were urging people to
do something, not just to believe in something.
133477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).

-
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sion protected by the first amendment freedom of speech.
Likewise, in Auerbach v. African American Teachers Association,
Inc., 134 the forcible exclusion of white teachers by black teachers
from a meeting held in a public school auditorium with permission of the school's principal was held to be conduct in violation
of the equal protection clause, while in National Socialist White
People's Party v. Ringers13 5 the right of a white racist group to
utilize for the expression of racist views a public auditorium
available for rental on a first-come-first-serve basis was held to be
protected by the first amendment.
The existence of limitations on the zone of protection offered by the first amendment guarantees raises the important
question whether racial discrimination practiced pursuant to
religious beliefs or simply out of a desire to choose one's own
associates is constitutionally protected, or whether the government may deny benefits to racially discriminatory entities. This
question was directly addressed in the free exercise context by a
federal district court in Bob Jones University v. Connally.'3 6 Bob
Jones University is a private religious university which openly
follows racially discriminatory policies based upon religious beliefs. In Bob Jones, the district court preliminarily enjoined the
Internal Revenue Service from removing the university's taxexempt status under an IRS regulation regarding private racially
discriminatory schools. Although the court was not explicit on
this point, it appears that the injunction was issued on the
ground that removing the university's section 501(c)(3)
qualification would violate the university's first amendment right
of free exercise of religion.1 3 7 The court distinguished Green v.
Kennedy, 1 38 in which a three-judge court preliminarily enjoined
the Secretary of the Treasury from granting tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools, on the ground that the racially
discriminatory policy of Bob Jones University, unlike the policy
of the schools in Green, "is, and always has been, based on
religious considerations." 139 The Supreme Court will shed some
light on the degree of protection afforded religiously dictated
discriminataion when it reviews the Bob Jones decision.' 4 °

"1356 F.

Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).

135473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973).
36 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.)

cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 116 (1973).
11 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956 (1970), sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
138 341 F. Supp. at 285 n.5.
139

Id. at 285.

40 Dictum offd by Judge Leventhal in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150

(DD.C.), affd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), suggests an opposite result from theBobJones result:
We are not now called upon to consider the hypothetical inquiry whether
tax-exemption or tax-deduction status may be available to a religious school that
practices acts of racial restriction because of requirements of religion. Such a
problem may never arise; and if it ever does arise, it will have to be considered
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When racial discrimination is not religiously dictated, the
only possible source of affirmative constitutional protection is the
first amendment freedom of association. But the Norwood Court,
in declaring racial discrimination by schools that received textbooks from the state to be violative of the equal protection
guarantee, refused to afford affirmative constitutional protection
to racial discrimination in the name of freedom of association:
"Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form
of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.' 14 ' The McGlotten Court, by requiring withdrawal of a government benefit on the basis of the racial practices of a nonreligious entity, was in accord with the Supreme
Court in Norwood.
2. Public Function
When a private entity becomes engaged in a "public" function, countervailing considerations of privateness are rendered
less significant, and constitutional restrictions should be more
readily applied. The concept of public function is not a clearly
defined one, but the Supreme Court has found it useful in
justifying the application of the first and fourteenth amendments
to a variety of situations-the conduct by a political party of
primary elections, 14 2 the regulation of the distribution of religious literature in a company-owned town, 1 43 the regulation of
union picketing in a shopping center, 4 4 and racial discrimination in the operation of a park.' 4 5 In Burton, the Supreme Court
observed that the garage building in which the restaurant was
located was dedicated "[a]s an entity "to 'public uses' in performance of the [Parking] Authority's 'essential governmental
functions'."' 1 46 And in Moose Lodge, the Court's finding of no state
in the light of the particular facts and issues presented, and in light of the
established rule... that the law may prohibit an individual from taking certain
action even though his religion commands or prescribes them.
Id. at 1169. A stronger statement along these lines was offered by Justice White in his
dissenting opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 671 n.2 (1971):
As a postscript I should note that both'the federal and state cases are decided on
specified Establishment Clause considerations, without reaching the questions
that would be presented if the evidence in any of these cases showed that any of
the involved schools restricted entry on racial or religious grounds or required
all students gaining admission to receive instruction in the tenets of a particular
faith. For myself, if such proof were made, the legislation would to that extent
be unconstitutional.
93 S. Ct. 2804, 2813 (1973).
'4'
"'
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
143 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
I'l Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
'45 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
146365 U.S. at 723.
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action was based in part upon the 1 4lack
of any public function
7
performed by the fraternal order.
A few recent lower federal court cases demonstrate how the
public function theory can be utilized to apply constitutional
restrictions to a wide variety of private conduct. In Eaton v. Board
of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital,1 48 the Fourth
Circuit found no state action in the conduct of a hospital which
received only 42% of its budget from the government. Six years
later, the court reversed its stand in Eaton v. Grubbs,1 4 9 a decision
involving the same hospital. In discussing the reasons for abandoning its previous holding, the court concluded that "most
importantly, the first Eaton case did not consider the argument
now being made that the 'private' hospital is fulfilling the function of the state."' 50 In McQueen v. Druker,15 1 a private landlord
who had purchased land from a city redevelopment authority,
subject to many restrictions imposed by the authority, was held
to act subject to constitutional restrictions, on the theory that he
was assisting the state in realizing its goal of providing low- and
moderate-income housing for those displaced by redevelopment.
In analyzing the public function performed by the private landlord, the court stated: "Here the function, while perhaps not so
traditionally governmental as parks, fire or police services, or
libraries, is today one of the major concerns of most cities of
substantial size. 15 2 In United States v. Barr, 53 private persons
who acted as process servers pursuant to a New York statute
were held to be within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment.
The court reasoned that nonofficial process servers "perform a
function of the sheriff, a public officer, when serving a summons
and complaint under the statutory authorization."' 54 In DeCarlo
v. Joseph Home & Co., '5 a private detective who made an arrest
under the Pennsylvania Professional Thieves Act was found to
have acted in the capacity of a police officer, and under color of
law. In Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 156 a private
managing corporation of urban redevelopment apartments that
benefited from tax exemptions as well as other government
14Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that the Moose Lodge, by serving liquor at a
private bar on its own premises, was not "located and operated in such surroundings that
although private in name, it discharges a function or performs a service that would
otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the State." 407 U.S. at 175.
148 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958).
149 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) (en banc).
15 0
1d. at 712-13.
"'s
15
2 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
Id. at 784.
15
295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.NA'. 1969).
154
Id. at 89 1. A similar result was reached in United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc.,
318 F. Supp. 1293, 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
155 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
156294 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). A similar conclusion was reached in
Male v. Crossroads Assoc., 469 F.2d 616, 620-22 (2d Cir. 1972).
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financial aid, and was under considerable government control,
was ruled to be bound by the fourteenth amendment.
The Moose Lodge and McGlotten cases can be distinguished
from each other on the basis of the public function concept.
McGlotten dealt with charitable tax incentives to fraternal
orders-government involvement with private conduct which
can be characterized as designed to induce private entities to
undertake a public function. As the McGlotten court noted,
charitable tax incentives have traditionally been defended on the
ground that by allowing deductions for charitable contributions
and exemptions for charitable organizations, "the Government
relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the
absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the
Government."' 57 Moose Lodge, on the other hand, involved a
private fraternal order licensed by the government to distribute
alcohol. While the operation of a private bar by a private organization on its own premises cannot be classified as a function or
service which the State would undertake in the absence of
private fraternal orders, the distribution of charitable funds
which are partially made up of government tax dollars can be
viewed as delegation of a public function by the government to a
private organization. It will become evident in the concluding
section of this Comment, in which the principles set forth in this
section are applied to various tax provisions, that the concept of
public function is a crucial one in determining whether various
tax incentives give rise to state action.
D.

The Nature of the Alleged Constitutional Violation

Both existing case law and policy considerations suggest that
different degees of government involvement are necessary to
activate different constitutional restrictions-more specifically,
that a lesser degree of government involvement suffices to activate the equal protection guarantee than is required to activate
due process safeguards or the establishment of religion clause.
One of the first cases to explicitly suggest the existence of such
varying standards was Bright v. Isenbarger,158 in which two students brought a civil rights action seeking readmission to a
parochial school after they had been expelled. In holding that
the school, which was the beneficiary of a real property tax
exemption, had not dismissed the students "under color of law,"
the district court stated:
Although no court has held that a different (less demanding) standard of what constitutes "sufficient" state
157338 F. Supp. at 456.
158314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aftd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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involvement is applicable where there are allegations of
racial discrimination, the fact that only a handful of the
successful "state action" cases have not involved challenges to racial discrimination and the considerations of
diversity and pluralism suggest this possibility .... 159
The principle that different degrees of government involvement
are required to activate the due process and equal protection
clauses was endorsed by a district court in another tax incentive
case, Pitts v. Department of Revenue: "[A] different standard must
be applied to ascertain state action in cases involving equal
protection than in cases involving other rights." 6 ° Judge
Friendly recently expressed approval of a dual approach to state
action in Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School:
while a grant or other index of state involvement may
be impermissible when it "fosters or encourages" discrimination on the basis of race, the same limited involvement may not rise to the level of "state action"
when the action in question
is alleged to affront other
6
constitutional rights.' 1
At first glance, the assertion that the same fktts could give
rise to a finding of state action for purposes of the equal
protection clause but no state action for purpbs'es df the due
process clause might seem disturbing. But thtre are cmpelling
historical and policy considerations which justify thii result. To
the extent that equal protection claims involve racial discrimination and are made under the fourteenth amendment, the result
is supported by the prevalent historical interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment. That amendment was adopted primarily
to counteract the forces of racism after the Civil War, and did
not contemplate the extension of constitutional safeguards outside the field of racial discrimination.162 It is reasonable, therefore, to apply the amendment more stringently in cases involving
racial discrimination than in other cases.
There is also a persuasive policy consideration weighing
against the extension of due process safeguards to all cases to
which the equal protection guarantee would extend. Every day,
organizations with government ties make countless private decisions that affect individuals' property, employment and
affiliations. If aggrieved individuals were entitled to notice, hearing and access to counsel before these decisions were made, the
159

d at 1394.
160333 F. Supp. 662, 668 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
161
478 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir. 1973).
See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
(1968).
112

HARV.
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ability of private entities to conduct their affairs smoothly and
efficiently would be severely hampered.
A framework for the application of constitutional restrictions to government involvement should distinguish equal protection claims not only from due process claims, but also from
claims brought under the establishment of religion clause. The
Supreme Court indicated in Norwood that the constitutional prohibition imposed upon government assistance to private activity
by the equal protection clause is more stringent than the prohibition commanded by the religion clauses. In deciding that granting free textbooks to private racially discriminatory schools violated the equal protection clause, the Court distinguished Board
of Education v. Allen,163 in which the Court had upheld the
constitutionality of a similar textbook program against an establishment of religion claim. A more stringent prohibition was
found to reside in the equal protection clause because
the transcendent value of free religious exercise in our
constitutional scheme leaves room for "play in the
joints" to the extent of cautiously delineated secular
governmental assistance to religious schools, despite the
fact that such assistance touches on the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by indirectly benefiting
the religious schools and their sponsors.
In contrast, although the Constitution does not
proscribe private bias, it places no value on discrimination as it does on
the values inherent in the Free
6 4
Exercise Clause.'
In other words, the Court found nothing in the racial discrimination context to create tension with the equal protection clause
in the way that the free exercise clause creates tension with the
establishment clause. Pitts v. Department of Revenue,16 5 Falkenstein
v. Department of Revenue, 166 and McGlotten167 applied this principle to the field of tax incentives before it was formally set forth
in Norwood, in order to distinguish the Supreme Court holding in
Walz v. Tax Commission. 168 In Walz, the Court held that granting a
real propery tax exemption to a religious organization was not
sufficient to violate the establishment clause. McGlotten presented
the clearest articulation of the principle later set forth in Norwood:
Defendant's reliance on Walz v. Tax Commission
. . . for the proposition that tax exemptions provide
163392 U.S. 236 (1968).
164 93 S. Ct. at 2813.
'"333 F. Supp. 662, 665-67 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
.66
350 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D. Ore. 1972).
338 F. SuP4 at 459 n.58.
168 397 U.S. M
(1970).
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insufficient Government involvement to violate the
Constitution is misplaced. The holding in Walz was that
exemption of church property from state property tax
did not violate the First Amendment Establishment
Clause. As such, it was premised on historical considerations peculiar to the First Amendment:
Few concepts are more deeply imbedded in the
fabric of our national life, beginning with
pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the
government to exercise at the very least this
kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches
and religious exercise generally ...
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment leads in
exactly the opposite direction. It was designed explicitly
to deal with the cancer of racial discrimination and a
neutrality is required on the
strict rather than benevolent
16 9
part of Government.
The Norwood decision seemingly removes Walz as an obstacle to
the conclusion that tax incentives are capable of violating the
equal protection clause. But the sweeping language of Walz may
remain of some significance to cases involving establishment
claims against tax incentives: "The grant of a tax exemption is
not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of
its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that
the church support the state."'170 By this language, the Court
appears to have both rejected the functional equivalence theory
and held that tax exemptions are of less constitutional
significance as a form of government involvement than direct
benefits. But the barrier that the Walz Court thereby erected to
the "constitutionalization" of tax incentives was seemingly removed by the Court' holding in Griffin and Nyquist.17 1 It is
difficult to assess how much of the Walz holding remains intact.
The majority opinion in Nyquist devoted considerable effort to
distinguishing Walz on three bases.' 72 First, the New York property tax exemption in Walz had been tolerated and approved
since colonial times, while there was no historical precedent for
the specific tax benefit in Nyquist. Second, the property tax
exemptions were viewed as government attempts to neutralize
the "hostility" inherent in the taxation process by minimizing
fiscal contact, while the "special" tax benefits in Nyquist were not
"neutral" but designed to advance religion. And third, the prop" 33.8 F.-Supp. at 459 n.58 (citations omitted).

397 U.S. at 675.
171See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
17293 S. Ct. at 2975-76.
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erty tax exemptions were aimed at a wide range of recipients,
while "special" tax benefits flowed primarily to the parents of
children attending sectarian schools.
In light of Griffin and Nyquist, it is likely that the language in
Walz rejecting the notion that tax incentives can be either
economic or constitutional equivalents of direct grants has lost its
effect. But whatever is left of Walz, the rationale of Norwood
precludes its transplantation into the realm of equal protection.
IV. A

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TAX INCENTIVES

The Necessity for Constitutional Examination of Tax Benefits

A.

If, as we have seen, direct government expenditures and tax
benefits confer functionally equivalent economic subsidies upon
otherwise private entities, it becomes readily apparent that the
constitutional restrictions which have traditionally been applied
to other forms of government involvement with private
conduct,' 7 3 including direct expenditures, should be applied to
tax benefits as well. The allocation of governmental resources
achieved through the use of tax benefits has a significant impact
upon private activity. 1 74 This enormous and heretofore virtually
unchecked leverage' 7 5 should be exercised only within the
173

See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
See note 220 infra.
M See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub norn. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Judge Leventhal explicitly avoided the constitutional issue,
basing his decision upon interpretation of the fnternal Revenue Code.
Several nonconstitutional grounds exist for challenging tax incentives. It would be
possible for the legislature to pass a statute denying tax incentives or other government
benefits to racially discriminatory private entities. The state of Maine followed this
approach, prohibiting any holder of a liquor license from discriminating on the basis of
race, religion or national origin. This statute was upheld by the highest state court in the
face of a first amendment claim of freedom of association. B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v.
Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607 (Me. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1893 (1973). Although this
legislative technique is useful in the context of racial discrimination, it is doubtful that it
could be used to deny tax incentives to racially nondiscriminatory religious organizations.
Under the entanglement analysis in Walz, 397 U.S. at 674, religious organizations have an
arguable constitutional right to some tax exemptions under thefirst amendment freedom
of religious exercise. See text accompanying notes 163-72 supra. Countervailing forces of
free exercise and free association may arise in all of the nonconstitutional avenues to
challenging tax incentives considered herein. In any event, the statutory approach which
Bittker ana Kaufman criticize in Taxes and Civid Rights, supra note 7, at 86, because they
feel that the social costs of government control may be too high, has been hailed as one
primary motivating factorbehind the recent desegregation of the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks. Philadelphia Inquirer, Jul. 20, 1973, § A, at 3, col. 3.
A second nonconstitutional approach which has been successful in a rather limited
context is the self-imposed administrative policy of the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to which discriminatory private schools are ineligible for tax incentives. See Rev.
Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cui. BULL. 230 (ruling that "charitable," as used in the Code, has to
be read in terms of the everchanging common law concept of charity; based upon
attitudes of present society and federal policy, a segregated school is not charitable). This
appears to be the only instance of administrative self-restraint attempted to date.
Another nonconstitutional alternative which has been adopted by several courts,
174
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parameters of the Constitution. A contrary conclusion would not
only be arbitrary and irrational, but would encourage legislatures
to achieve through the use of tax benefits ends known to be
constitutionally impermissible if sought through a direct expenditure scheme, circumventing the spirit of the Constitution. The
application of constitutional restraints to tax benefits will not
necessarily affect the allocation of theses benefits in the same
manner or to the same extent as it affects the allocation of direct
government expenditures, but tax benefits must not be permitted to remain free of constitutional examination.
It is incontrovertible that the constitutionalization of the tax
laws will increase their complexity and difficulty of administration. Significant additional burdens may be placed upon the
agencies charged with that administration. Undoubtedly those
agencies would become obligated to monitor the conduct of the
recipients of tax benefits to a greater extent than is presently
their practice. As significant as these additional burdens may be,
administrative inconvenience is an insufficient rationale to justify
the abrogation of constitutional rights. 1 6 A difference in the
difficulty of monitoring the conduct of the recipients of government largesse between economically equivalent programs should
not be permitted to become a distinction of constitutional magnitude.
The authors of Taxes and Civil Rights have suggested an
additional reason, as a matter of policy, that the Internal Revenue Code should not be subjected to the rigors of constituincluding the district court in McGlotten, is embodied in § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), which provides that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." However, it is not clear that tax incentives
constitute "Federal financial assistance" under § 601. See Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note
7, at 79-85. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is inapplicable to state tax incentives. State civil
rights statutes present an additional alternative. Pennsylvania's public accommodation
statute was construed to prohibit private fraternal orders from discriminating in the
distribution of alcoholic beverages. Commonwealth v. Loyal Order of Moose, 448 Pa.
451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972). This decision was also cited as contributing to the recent
decision of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks to desegregate. Philadelphia
Inquirer, Jul. 20, 1973, § A, at 3, col. 3. A final possibility is a construction of the laws
granting tax incentives which renders discriminatory entities ineligible. But it is far from
clear that such an argument is tenable. See Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 74-79.
176 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972), cited in United States Dep't
of
Agriculture v. Murry, 93 S. Ct. 2832, 2835 (1973):
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate
state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizen from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Another answer to the problem of administrative inconvenience is that the Internal
Revenue Service seems to have survived the impact of its self-imposed regulation denying
tax incentives to racially discriminatory private schools. This serves as an excellent model
for expanding the auditing function of tax agencies.
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tional restraint. They fear that if the theory of McGlotten is
adopted all tax benefits necessarily will be subjected to constitutional limitations. 17 7 Bittker and Kaufman argue that tax benefits
are ubiquitous and virtually indistinguishable from each other.
Therefore, once tax benefits have been constitutionalized under
the McGlotten analysis, all tax benefits regardless of their differences in purpose and impact will suffer the same fate.
If this conclusion were valid, it would certainly militate
against constitutional scrutiny of tax incentives. Examination of
the history of constitutional adjudication regarding government
involvement with private activity will, however, allay this fear.
Government involvement of various types has been held
insufficient to bring otherwise private conduct within the pros80
cription of the fourteenth amendment.17 8 Grants, 7 9 charters,
8 3
1 82
8
and the tax
liquor licenses
leasing agreements,' ' textbooks,

free status of government bonds' 8 4 have failed to activate constitutional restrictions. If courts were able to draw the line
between the permissible and the impermissible in those areas,
there is no reason to anticipate that all tax benefits will be held to
impose constitutional prohibitions upon their recipients. The
constitutional analysis developed in the previous section provides
a flexible, comprehensive framework within which to constitutionalize the Internal Revenue Code, as well as tax incentives
at the state and local government levels.' 8 5
B. A Normative Concept of Income; The Distinction Between
Tax Incentives and Tax Benefits
8 6
The distinction between tax benefits and tax incentives1
must be premised upon a workable and generally acceptable
177 Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 86.
'78See text accompanying notes 62-172 supra.
79
1 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (197 1) (involving the first amendment religion
clauses); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (involving the first amendment
establishment of religion clause); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (involving
first amendment establishment of religion clause). For several examples in the realm of
the equal protection guarantee, see text accompanying notes 85-91 supra.
ISOIn Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 353F.Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972) (mem.)
the court held that the mere grant or a congressional charter, absent discriminatory
language in the charter itself, was not signi cant overnment involvement with the
sexually discriminatory membership clause of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
11 In Hunt v. McNair, 93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973), the Supreme Court held that leasing
portions of a college campus by a state entity to a religious organization did not violate
the establishment clause.
'8 A New York statute providing for the gratuitous lending of books by the state to
students in both public and parochial schools was upheld by the Supreme Court in Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
18. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
184 Hunt v. McNair, 93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973).
' See notes 62-172 supra & accompanying text.
'88 Compare the definition of "tax benefit," note 26 supra, with the definition of "tax
incentive," note I supra.
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definition of income. There is near-consensus among tax
scholars regarding the desirability of constructing a normative
model of income.18 7 Many of those who advocate the tax
expenditure theory do so in full awareness of the magnitude of
the problems awaiting any attempt to arrive at a universally
acceptable definition of income.18 8 Professor Bittker has, however, expressed serious misgivings about both the desirability
and the utility of any such model, 8 9 criticizing the HaigSimons definition with particular vigor. 19° Although Taxes and
Civil Rights contains no explicit criticism of the quest for a
"'7 For tax scholars who are reluctant to accept the normative income tax model, see
Slater, Tax Incentives of State and Local Governments, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX
INCENTIVES (1971), and Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, Property Tax Exemptions for
Charitable, Educational, Religious and Governmental Institutions in Connecticut, 4 CONN. L.
REv. 181 (1971). Among those scholars who seem willing to work towards such a
normative model are: C. KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 88
(1960); Aaron, supra note 28; Blum, supra note 2; Brannon, A Requiem for the Investment
Tax Credit, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES (1971); Taubman & Rasche,
supra note 28.
A pioneer treatment of the concept of a normative tax model is Wolfman, Federal
Tax Poicy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 171, 173-74 (1965):
Reference to a tax provision as "preferential" or "special" does not connote
opposition to the social or economic objective which Congress has used the tax
law to support. It does mean the provision deviates from a norm. Implicit in the
reference is the idea that the income tax has an essential integrity; that there is a
fundamental standard for determining the tax base and the applicable rates ....

The concept of "special relief' or "preference" means to me a deviation
from a relatively neutral net income base or the application of rates which are
tailored according to the source from which income is derived or the purpose
for
which it is spent.... It does mean there is a departure from standard.
'"8 See Aaron, Inventory of Existent Tax Incentives-Federal, in TAX INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES 39 (1971); Blum, FederalIncome Tax Reform-Twenty Questions,
41 TAXES 672, 679 (1963); Surrey, Tax Incentives-ConceptualCriteriafor Identification and
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX
INCENTIVES 3, 5 (1971).
89Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 63.
190
The authors of Taxes and Civil Rights assert that for "tax commentators who
believe that this distinction [between tax incentives and tax provisions merely defining
income] is fruitful, the standard is the Haig-Simons definition of income." Id. 63. Briefly
stated, the Haig-Simons definition provides: "Personal income may be defined as the
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question." H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62 (198), cited in Taxes
and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 64. In light of Professor Bittker's previous exchange of
articles with Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, and the published statement of other
advocates of the tax expenditure theory, it is quite difficult to understand why he
maintains such a position. These articles are, in order of publication: Bittker, Accounting
for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT. TAX J. 244 (1969); Surrey &
Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT. TAX J. 528
(1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22
NAT. TAX J. 538 (1969). An example of a statement by another commentator may be
found in Aaron, What is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?, 22 NAT. TAX J. 543, 547
(1969). The proponents of the tax expenditure theory themselves disagree over the
proper definition of income, although allof course agree that some definition is possible
and desirable. Surrey disagrees with some portions of the Treasury Tax Expenditure
Budget. See Surrey, FederalIncome Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace
Tax Expenditures with Direct GovernmentalAssistance, 84 HARV. L.Rv. 352, 384 n.58 (1970).
Surrey also has points of disagreement with Aaron. Id. 365 n.17. Aaron proposes his own
definition of tax incentives which is at odds with the Treasury Department s. See Aaron,
Inventory of Existing Tax Incentives-Federal, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES (1971).
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normative tax model, Professor Bittker has voiced his dissatisfaction on previous occasions:' 9 ' "I cannot discern behind the
tangle of rules that make up the income averaging and net
operating loss provisions an 'ideal,' 'model,' or 'correct
approach'--modifications of which constitute 'tax expenditures.' "192
This position is, however, a minority view.' 93 In fact, one
commentator who agrees with the assertion in Taxes and Civil
Rights that tax provisions benefiting fraternal orders are not tax
incentives but only tax benefits disagrees with Bittker regarding
the utility of a normative model of income: "[I]n the end it is
useful to speak in terms of an ideal income tax and to evaluate
departures from the ideal as tax expenditures whose purposes,
not being reflected in the ideal, must be extraneous to those of
the tax."' 94Certainly the misgivings expressed regarding the
efficacy and utility of a normative tax model fail to present either
a persuasive case for the total rejection of the theory that
income-defining tax provisions can be distinguished from tax
incentives, or a compelling argument against the application of
constitutional restrictions to the government subsidy conferred
by tax benefits. Thus, it will be assumed that a generally acceptable normative model of income can be derived.
A normative concept of income is essential in distinguishing
tax incentives from the more general class of tax benefits. Tax
benefits include all tax provisions which confer benefits upon
taxpayers, encompassing deductions, deferrals, credits and exemptions. Several tax benefits exist not to induce private activity,
however, but to provide a more accurate measure of income or
property value. Such provisions have been enacted for the purI-In Churches, 1Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 128b, 1296 (1969), Bittker
wrote:
[T]he anti-exemption case presupposes a consensus on the "proper" ambit of a
tax; unless we can see the whole, we cannot know if something has been carved
out. Unfortunately for any hope of readily identifying "exemptions," however,
"ideal" taxes are hard to come by, even if our models are academic projects
rather than statutes shaped by the interaction between relentless lobbyists and
harried legislators.. . . The anti-exemption case, then, suffers from a crisis of
definition.
In A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REv. 925, 985

(1967), Bittker wrote:
There are many problem areas in which the search for "preferences" is doomed
to fail because we cannot confidently say which provisions are "rules" and which
are "exceptions." ... The central source of difficulty is the fact that the income
tax structure cannot be discovered, but must be constructed; it is the final result
of a multitude of debatable judgments.... When we turn to the field of income
taxation.., we do not begin with a consensus on the meaning of income, but
with a myriad of arguments about what should be taxed, when, and to whom.

192 Bittker, Accountingfor Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the NationalBudget, 22 NAT. TAx J.

244, 258 (1969).
193See sources cited note 187 supra.
'9

(1972).

Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. Rxv. 309, 312
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pose of facilitating the operation of the tax laws or aiding in the
identification of income and should not be considered to constitute significant government involvement with otherwise private
activity. Thus, due to their very nature, those provisions whose
purpose is to define income or property value should not be
subjected to constitutional scrutiny.' 95 Tax incentives, on the
95A loose analogy may usefully be drawn to the necessities-of-life distinction
recently developed and utilized by the Supreme Court in both first and fourteenth
amendment contexts. The necessities-of-life distinction presumes that there are several
government activities which, although they have the indirect effect of subsidizing private
conduct, exist primarily to facilitate the ongoing operation and maintenance of a
governmental structure. Such government activities were characterized as "necessities of
fife" by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), and
should be distinguished from those government activities which are capable of activating
constitutional restrictions:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private
entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject
to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since state-furnished services include
such necessities of life
as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, such a
holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct set forth in The Civil Rights Cases .... [W]here the
impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have "significantly
involved itself with invidious discriminations," in order for the discriminatory
action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition.
Id. at 173 (emphasis added). The Court reiterated the distinction in the more recent case
of Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973), where a Mississippi statute enacted prior
to the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), provided free
textbooks to students in public and private schools. The statute was invalidated to the
extent that it provided assistance to students in private racially discriminatory schools:
We do not suggest that a State violates its constitutional duty merely because
it has provided any form of state service that benefits private schools ....
[Textbooks] are to be distinguished from generalized services government might
provide to schools in common with others. Moreover, the textbooks provided to
private school students by the State in this case [are not]... "such necessities of
life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection."
93 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
In the context of the first amendment religion clauses, the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), drew a similar exception for government activity which is
so "generalized" as to be incapable of activating constitutional restrictions:
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and
state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable. . .. Fire inspections, and building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under
compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible
contacts.
Id. at 614.
The implicit assumption of the necessities-of-life distinction is that all private entities
are entitled to a basic minimum package of government-furnished services and benefits,
regardless of their beliefs, policies or actions. See notes 95-103 supra & accompanying text.
Building permits, driver's icenses, sewer service, sildewalks, streets, parks, postal service,
utilities, liquor licenses and fire and police protection should be among the benefits
supplied to private entities without regard to their discriminatory activities. But when a
government-furnished service or benefit transcends this basic category, the nature of the
relationship thus engendered between the government and the private entity should be
evaluated in light of constitutional restrictions. The necessities-of-life distinction is a
threshold barrier to constitutional review, which automatically exempts certain government involvement with private conduct from constitutional scrutiny. Although the
distinction suffers from definitional difficulties, its basic point is clear: minimum governmental services essential to the ongoing governmental structure may be provided
neutrally to all private entities regardless of their policies.
The exception provided for those tax benefits which are designed to aid the
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other hand, include those tax benefits which are intended to
induce private activity and not to aid in the measurement of
income or property value. 19 6 Tax incentives must therefore be
subjected at least initially to constitutional analysis, although not
197
all will be found to activate constitutional restrictions.
In this context, difficulties inherent in the definition of
income and in the decision as to which tax benefits are true
income or property value defining provisions become significant
indeed. Many provisions exist in tax codes for obscure reasons
and the determination whether a particular provision is truly
income defining can on occasion be virtually impossible. Despite
the difficulties that inhere in reaching a generally acceptable
normative concept of income, some benefits are clearly intended
to define income and not to encourage particular conduct. One
generally recognized example is the business expense
deduction. 198 While this tax benefit subsidizes private activity, its
primary function is to enable the government to measure more
accurately the net income of a business. By granting business
expense deductions, the government takes into account the expenses reasonably incurred in the course of generating income,
for the purpose of making a realistic computation of a business'
taxable income. Judge Bazelon, speaking for the court in McGlotten, noted other straightforward examples of income defining
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code: section 172, relating to
net operating loss carryovers and carrybacks, and sections
1301-05; dealing with income averaging. 1 99
Other provisions, however, are not as evidently intended to
define income or measure property. In ascertaining the nature
of such provisions one area of great difficulty is the determination of the relative weight to be afforded legislative intent and
economic effect. How significant should legislative intent be in
determining whether a particular tax provision is related primarily to the measurement of income? If the legislative history is
either silent or inconclusive regarding the purpose of a particular tAxk provision, what other factors should govern the determination? Should a provision which was clearly intended by the
legislature to induce private activity automatically be classified as
a tax incentive regardless of its practical economic effect? If the
measurement of income or property value is to some extent analogous. Although such
structural provisions unquestionably do result in economic benefit to private entities, they
are intended primarily to facilitate the operation of the tax laws. Like the basic minimum
package of government services, they should not activate constitutional restrictions,
regrdless o the policies of their recipients. It is only tax incentives-those provisions
which are primarily intended to induce private activity-which would be subjected to
constitutional
scrutny.
96
9' 7 See note 1 supra.
See text accompanying notes 222-62 infra.
198 INT. R
CODE OF 1954, § 162.
' 338 F. Supp. at 457 n.44.
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distinction between tax incentives and other tax provisions for
constitutional purposes were to rest solely upon legislative intent, would this approach contradict the Supreme Court's directive that motive should not be utilized as an index for violations
of the equal protection clause? 200 How should a tax provision be
classified if the legislature enacted it for administrative convenience, but it continues in the code as an inducement to private
activity? Arguably, the deduction for mortgage interest is just
such a provision. 20 1 If the actual effect exerted by such a tax
provision is deemed to be an important factor in the determination, how should this effect be measured? The significance of
these problems of intent can be demonstrated by an examination
of the histories of the two tax benefits discussed in Taxes and Civil
Rights, sections 170(c)(4) and 501(c)(8) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
The legislative history of section 170(c)(4) leaves little doubt
that the charitable gift deduction was intended by Congress to
induce private activity-charitable contributions by taxpayers. Section 170(c)(4)'s predecessor was enacted during World War I at a
time when public opinion feared that private philanthropic support of charities might be halted. 20 2 It was introduced by Senator
Hollis of New Hampshire, who advised that charitable gifts serve
a public purpose and should be encouraged by Congress
through the device of a tax deduction:
[F]or every dollar that a man contributes for these
public charities

. . .

the public gets 100 per cent; it is all

devoted to that purpose. If it were undertaken to support such institutions through the Federal Government
or local governments and the taxes were imposed for
the amount they would only get the percentage ....
Instead of getting the full amount
they would get a
20 3
third or a quarter or a fifth.

Twenty-one years later, a House Report acknowledged the
benefit gained by the government from charitable deductions:
"The Government is compensated for its loss of revenue by its
relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be
met by appropriations from public funds. 20 4
200 See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
201INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163.

202 Washington Post, Aug. 25, 1917, cited in 55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917):
This country can not abandon or impoverish the great structure of private
charity and education that has been one of the most notable achievements of
American civilization. Therefore with every additional dollar the Government
finds it necessary to take in taxation it become increasingly necessary to accept
the principle of the pending amendment and leave untaxed that part of every
citizen's income which he may give voluntarily to the public good.
20355 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917).

204 H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938), cited in 338 F. Supp. at 456.
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Although the legislative history of section 170(c)(4) provides
a clear indication that Congress originally intended the section to
encourage private charitable gifts, some tax scholars have suggested that section 170(c)(4) today exerts only a minimal effect
on charitable giving. 20 5 Positing that section 170(c)(4) has little
influence upon the private activity which Congress intended to
stimulate when it enacted the provision, should it nevertheless be
considered a tax incentive? How can the incentive effect be
quantified? And what result follows if it can be shown that the
section has a partial but inconclusive incentive effect on private
charitable giving?
The legislative history of section 501(c)(8) is less clear than
that of section 170(c)(4). Bittker and Kaufman assert that Congress did not intend section 501(c)(8) to induce private activity,
but rather that the income tax exemption for fraternal orders
was originally drafted for administrative convenience.2 0 6
A close examination of the legislative history of section
501(c)(8) reveals that the interpretation set forth in Taxes and
Civil Rights is incomplete. Bittker and Kaufman choose the
Revenue Act of 1913207 as the origin for their historical study of
section 501(c)(8).20 8 But the roots of section 501(c)(8) stretch
further back; most of the language of the exemption in the
Revenue Act of 1913 is identical to a provision of the Act of
1909209 that exempted fraternal orders from an excise tax on
corporations and other entities. 21 0 Debate on the floor of the
House merely intended to adopt the fraternal order exemption
of 1909 with regard to income tax. 21 ' Therefore the Act of 1909,
not the Revenue Act of 1913, should be probed for evidence of
congressional intent.
Senate debate over the 1909 Act indicates that the fraternal
order exemption reflected congressional recognition of the
charitable nature of such organizations. One question considered
by the Senate was whether the Act, which by its language applied
to "every insurance company, 2 12 was intended to apply to
fraternal beneficiary companies. Senator Flint stated that the Act
was intended to exempt from the excise tax those organizations
"where the insurance is a mere incident to the other part of their
20
5 See Taussig, Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment oj Charitable
Contributions,
20 NAT. TAX J. 1 (1967).
206
207 Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 64-65.
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172, cited in J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S
LEGISLATIvE
HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861, at 983-1007 (1938).
0
. Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 65 n.40.
29 Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113.
2
0j. SEIDMAN, supra note 207, at 1008.
211 50 CONG. REC. 509 (1913): "Paragraph G [which contained the fraternal order
exemption] imposes a like normal tax upon the net profits, gains, or income of corporations without exemption. The provisions and administrative machinery of the present
corporation-tax
law [the Act of 1909] are, in the main, re-enacted."
21
J. SEIDMAN, supra note 207, at 1009.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:414

work, which is fraternal and charitable. '2 13 No consideration was
given to whether those fraternal beneficiary companies were
operating at a profit. The justification for their exemption was
their charitable nature. The Conference Committee Report on
the Revenue Act of 1913214 contains further evidence supporting
the view that Congress exempted fraternal orders out of concern
for their charitable nature, rather than a desire for administrative convenience. The report extended the exemption previously
available to fraternal orders to "civic organizations operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. 2 1 5 Additionally,
section 501(c)(3), 2 16 which Bittker and Kaufman concede not to
have been a product of congressional concern for administrative
convenience, 2 17 appeared in the same paragraph with the fraternal order exemption in the Act of 1909.218
The legislative history of'section 501(c)(8) is inconclusive; it
can be argued either that Congress intended the section as an
incentive to private activity, or as an administrative convenience.
Whatever the original legislative intent may have been, section
501(c)(8) is no longer explicable solely as administrative. The
passive income of fraternal orders has grown substantially since
1909. For example, the Grand Lodge of the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks of America in 1972 had a passive
investment income of over $105,000.219 Given the inconclusive

nature of the legislative history, should the classification of
section 501(c)(8) as a tax incentive depend upon an appraisal of
its operative effect?
Some resolution of conflicting indicia of intent must be
sought. Therefore it is suggested that when it is unclear from the
face of the statute whether a tax benefit is an income defining
21344 CONG. REC. 3938 (emphasis added).
214 H.R. REP. No. 86, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 26

(1913), cited in J.

SEIDMAN, supra

note

207, 215
at 1002.
Id.
216 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3): "Corporations, and any community chest,
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . [are exempted
under § 501(a)]."
217 Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 71.
218J. SEIDMAN, supra note 207.
2
19'The passive investment income of the Grand Lodge for the past 5 fiscal years was
as follows:
1968-$74,782.79
1969-$79,864.40
1970-$95,577.63
1971-$102,502.81
1972-$105,172.29
The passive investment of the Elks Magazine for the past 5 fiscal years was as follows:
1968-:44,997.59
1969-$63,322.98
1970-$99,768.29
1971-$97,596.03
1972-$84,879.16
Stipulation of Facts, McGlotten v. Shultz, Civ. No. 3377-70 (D.D.C. 1971).
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provision or a tax incentive, legislative history be consulted first;
only if there is residual confusion need the operative effect be
evaluated and quantified. Legislative history is demonstrably a
dangerous morass, but all tax benefits, regardless of intent,
produce an economic benefit for taxpayers. The practical prob-'
lems related to the evaluation of operative incentive effect are
even more significant than those inherent in the study of legislative history.
Despite the serious definitional difficulties inherent in formulating a normative model of income capable of distinguishing
between tax incentives and income defining provisions, advocates
of the tax expenditure theory have persisted in their attempts.
Such difficulties do not require total abandonment of the concept of tax expenditures. Nor should they preclude constitutional review of those provisions which are generally considered
unrelated to the measurement of income. The allocation of a
government subsidy of such overwhelming proportions as that
demonstrated in the Treasury Department's Tax Expenditure
Budget 22 0 should be exempt from constitutional review only if it
can be conclusively demonstrated that there is no possible
method to identify any provision unrelated to the measurement
of income or property value. As Henry Aaron suggests: "[N]o
compendium of narrowly focused fiscal instruments such as the
Tax-Expenditure Budget will be immune to the type of criticism
advanced by Bittker. Theoretical sloppiness does not critically
impair its practical value.'
C.

The Application of the Constitutional Framework
to Tax Incentives

Those tax benefits which can be distinguished as tax incentives should be analyzed to determine whether it is appropriate
to subject their recipients to constitutional restrictions. Not all tax
incentives will constitute state action sufficient to activate constitutional restrictions, but all must be subjected to constitutional
scrutiny. The four-part inquiry developed in the preceding section provides a comphensive but flexible framework within
which to conduct this analysis.
Sections 170(c)(4) and 501(c)(7),(8) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 2 2 the tax incentives discussed in Taxes and Civil Rights
See notes 26-61 supra & accompanying text.
Aaron, Inventoy ofExistant Tax Incentives-Federal,in TAx INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,
TAX INCENTIVES 45 (1971).
220
221
222

SEC. 170. CHARITABLE, ETC., CONTRIBUTIONS AND GIFTS.
(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.(1) GENERAL RuLE-There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the
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and evaluated in McGlotten, provide excellent examples for this
constitutional analysis. They will be probed in detail to discover whether they should activate constitutional restrictions.
Additionally, several provisions chosen from the Treasury Department's Tax Expenditure Budget 2 3 will be discussed, providing a range of examples which should adequately demonstrate
the frequency with which tax incentives will be subjected to
constitutional prohibitions.
It may be useful at this point to recapitulate briefly the four
elements central to the constitutional analysis already developed: 224 (1) the nature and degree of government involvement with the otherwise private entity; (2) the nexus between the
government involvement and the challenged private activity; (3)
the nature of the conduct engaged in by the private entity-that
is, the privateness or the publicness of the conduct; and (4) the
nature of the constitutional claim-that is, whether the conduct
is challenged as a violation of the equal protection guarantee, the
due process guarantee, or the first amendment religious guarantees. It is to be noted that, although all four elements will be
relevant, the approach is flexible and the relative weight of each
of the elements may vary with respect to different tax incentives.
taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if
verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
(c) CHARITABLE CoNrRBtrrloN DEFINED.-For purposes of this section, the term
"charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the
use of(4) In the case of a contribution or gift by an individual, a domestic
fraternal society, order, or association, operating under the lodge system, but
only if such contribution or gift is to be used exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.

SEC.

501.

EXEMPTION FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS,
CERTAIN TRUSTS, ETC.
(a) EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION.-An organization described in subsection (c) or
(d) or section 401 (a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless
such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.
(c) LIST OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS.-The following organizations are referred
to in subsection (a):
(7) Clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and
other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder.
(8) Fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations(A) operating under the lodge system or for the exclusive benefit of the
members of a fraternity itself operating under the lodge system, and
(B) providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to
the members of such society, order, or association or their dependents.
INT. 223
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170, 501.
See text accompanying notes 26-61 supra.
224 See text accompanying notes 62-172 supra.
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Sections
orders from
operation of
contributions

501(c)(7),(8) exempt nonprofit clubs and fraternal
income taxation. Section 170(c)(4), through the
section 170(a)(1), provides for the deductibility of
to such fraternal orders if the contributions are

used for charitable puposes. 2 25 Although the sections are not

parellel and serve quite different purposes, they are analyzed
concurrently for contrast, because the court in McGlotten dealt
specifically with them, and because a ruling or verification is
essential to eligibility under each.
The natural point of departure for the constitutional
analysis of these provisions is an inquiry into the nature and
degree of government involvement with the otherwise private
recipients of the subsidies they confer. Government approval
and control of the charitable tax exempt organizations will be
discussed first.
Arguably, the granting of a charitable tax incentive places a
government badge of approval on the conduct of the recipients
of that incentive. Prospective donors tend to shun those organizations which have not been verified under section 170(a)(1) or
ruled upon under section 501(c), gravitating toward organizations which offer assured deductibility. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue has acknowledged that government regulation
has a channelling effect on charitable funds:
While all of this time is passing [before a section 501(c)
determination is issued], the oiganization is dormant
for lack of contributions and those otherwise interested
in its program lose their interest and move on to other
organizations blessed with the Internal Revenue Service
imprimatur ....
Kenneth Eliasberg has noted that "without a favorable Service
ruling, it [would] be almost impossible to attract outside

contributions.1 227 Private foundations have felt the practical ef-

fect of this channelling process, especially in the wake of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969.228 The influence of the government on the
22

5 See note 222 supra.
Thrower, IRS is consideringfar reachingchanges in ruling on exempt organizations, 34-

2 26

J.

TAXATION
227

168 (1971).

Eliasberg Exempt Organizations and Charitable Contributions:The Tax Reform Act of
1969-Sections 501(c) and 170, 23 U. So. CAL. 1971 TAX INST. 357, 361 n.9.

228 Ruth Chance, Executive Director of the Rosenberg Foundation, while discussing
the effects of the 1969 Act on the relationship between foundations and grantees, spoke
of increased monitoring of the activities of grantees by the donor foundations. Chance,
OperationalEffects, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY 103
(1972). Both she and Thomas H. Wright, Jr. of the Ford Foundation recommend
requesting all potential grantees to furnish foundations with copies of their exemption
rulings from the Internal Revenue Service. The Ford Foundation follows this procedure
in every case, and also asks for a copy of the Form 4653 sent by prospective grantees to
the Internal Revenue Service, plus any feedback from the Service regarding the Form
4653. See id. at 109; Wright, Grantee Selection and Supervision: Legat Requirements and
PracticalProblems, in 10 CONFERENCE ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 127, 130, 134 (1971).
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allocation of charitable funds is so great the the Internal Revenue Service has proposed several reforms to expedite the
229
process of securing a favorable ruling.

Lower federal courts have acknowledged that a Service
ruling can create the popular impression of government approval among the general public. The court in Green v.
Kennedy2 30 took judicial notice of this effect in the context of
contributions to racially discriminatory private schools, and the
court in McGlotten held that "the government has marked certain
organizations as 'Government Approved' with the result that such
organizations may solicit funds from the general public on the
'231
basis of that approval.
This sense of government approval of private conduct may
also arise from tax incentives granted on the state and local
levels. The court in Falkenstein concluded that Oregon, by granting a charitable exemption, "places its stamp of approval on the
Elks Lodge as an organization that furthers the legislative policy
'232
of the State.
Although those organizations with positive determinations
from the IRS can actively solicit funds with the Service determination underscored in their advertisements, tax scholars do not
all agree that this necessarily connotes government approval of
the organization or its activities to the public.2 3 3 Many may view
this as signifying merely that the organization has successfully
conquered the inevitable government red tape. Regardless of the
12 Thrower, supra note 226, at 168-70.
230309 F. Supp. at 1135.
13' 338 F. Supp. at 456.
232 Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D. Ore. 1972).
The IRS also publishes the Tentative Cumulative List of Organizations, a compilation of
organizations, including fraternal orders, described in § 170(c). Both Loyal Order of
Moose Supreme Lodge of the World and Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks Charity
Fund are listed. One of Bittker's and Kaufman's arguments.against the proposition that
!he government places its seal of approval upon fraternal orders by granting tax
incentives is that "the Treasury's Cumulative List of Exempt Organizations, which is
regularly consulted by tax payers who want assurance that their contributions will be
deductible [excludes] § 501(c)(7) fraternal orders." Taxes and Civil Rights, supra note 7, at
72 n.55. Acknowledging the importance of obtaining this listing, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has written:
Because of the "tax breaks" attendant to contributions to corporations qualifying
under § 170(c) of the Code, qualification thereunder is a precious possession and
removal from the Cumulative List, OrganizationsDescribed in Section 170(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is a damain-sometimes fatal-injury to the
financial status of any "charitable" organization. Potential contributors with a
minimum of business acumen are careful to get the most for their contributed
dollar, and one certain way not to do so is to contribute to non-§ 170 corporations.
"Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, Civ. No. 71-1299 at 12 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 11, 1973).
The affirmative use of Service rulings in fundraising campaigns by charitable
organizations-particularly private segregated schools in the South-is well documented.
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION-1966-67, at 142;
Spratt, Federal Tax Exemption for Private Segregated Schools: The CrumblingFoundation, 12
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1970).
211 See, Taussig, Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions, 20 NAT. TAX J. 1 (1967).
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perceptions of the public, one point is clear: charitable tax
incentives do not in fact necessarily bestow affirmative government approval upon the activities engaged in by the particular
charitable organizations. Thus, despite judicial acknowledgement
of the public impression conveyed government approval of
charitable organizations, it seems that no firm conclusion may be
drawn regarding the constitutional weight to be afforded government approval in an analysis of charitable tax incentives.
Very similar considerations emerge in an analysis of the
degree of control exercised by the federal government over the
individual recipients of incentives. Section 170(a)(1) provides
that charitable contributions can be deducted only "if verified
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate."
Those scholars who suggest that this section is not a source or
regulatory control2 34 cannot dispute that there is an explicit
requirement in section 170(a)(1) that a contribution be verified.
It could be argued that this requirement is seldom invoked, and
thus serves to exert little operative control. But the Supreme
Court in Burton cautioned against such an argument: "[N]o State
may effectively abdicate its responsibilities [under the Fourteenth
Amendment] by either ignoring them or by merely failing to
discharge them whatever the motive may be. 23 5
An income tax exemption under section 510(a) is similarly
unavailable to an organization unless its tax exempt status has
been established by the Internal Revenue Service,2 36 or it has
notified. the Service that it believes itself qualified for
exemption.23 7 Furthermore, if an organization fails to give
notification of "material changes in its character, purposes or
methods of operation, 2' 3- 8 the Service may revoke its determination letter retroactively. Commissioner Thrower recognized this
coercive power over charitable organizations: "We know that our
denial or exemption, or even our refusal to rule on the
organization's qualifications, may doom the organization. 2 3 9
The Tax Reform Act of 1969240 further tightened the

government's grip on exempt organizations. As a result of the
'3 Bittker and Kaufman underplay the regulatory role of the Internal Revenue
Service under § 170(a)(1) by contending that "a ruling or determination letter... is not a
prerequisite to deductibility," and that deductibility 'can be established after the fact by
evidence that the organization met the standards of" § 170. Taxes and Civil Rights, supra
note 7, at 72.
235 365 U.S. at 725.
236
Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1(c) (1971). See Eliasberg,supra note 227, at 359; Sugarman,
Current Legislative Changes in the Tax Treatment of CharitableFoundations:The Tax Reform Act
of 1969,
22 U. So. CAL. 1970 TAX INST. 547, 585.
237
Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(c) (1971). See Koch, Reporting requirements for private
foundations
spelled out infinal regs, 35 J. TAXATION 304, 305 (1971).
2381Id.
305.

239 Thrower, supra note 226, at 168.
240 Pub. L. No. 91-172, cited in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457 n.48
(D.D.C. 1972).
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new legislation, fraternal orders are no longer absolved of the
general requirement of section 501(a) that organizations file
annual information returns, 24 1 which must include, inter alia, the
names and addresses of all substantial contributors, directors,
trustees and highly compensated employees. In addition to
broadening the disclosure requirements to include fraternal orders, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 enlarged the scope of information required in these annual reports,2 42 and instituted a new
penalty system for failure to file. 2 43 Kenneth Eliasberg noted that
these new disclosure provisions are indicative of an increasingly
aggressive stance on the part of Congress in exerting regulatory
power over tax incentives:
[I]t is the new procedures-returns, reporting requirements and disclosure-that makes the Act a noteworthy
legislative effort, for it indicates that Congress is not
only concerned with the conduct at which the substantives [sic] rules are aimed, but, more significantly, that it
has given the Internal Revenue Service the tools with
which to more readily discover improprieties.2 4 4
And the administrative approach followed with respect to private
segregated schools-defining the word "charitable" as used in
the Code to exclude segregated schools-demonstrates a large
untapped reservoir of control over the recipients of charitable
tax incentives.2 45
The government's role in regulating charitable organizations
should not be exaggerated, however. It was the lack of legislative
review and administrative enforcement which prompted the
present controversy over the use of tax incentives to implement
social policy. But it is apparent that the federal government has
begun to take a more active and assertive stance in controlling
activity supported by charitable tax incentives. Although no
concrete observations on the quantitative significance of charitable tax incentives upon a specific institution can be accurately
made without empirical data, some general thoughts may be
offered. The quantum approach suffers from inflexibility, but it
may be of utility in those instances in which the other elements
of state action are muddled. 246 The quantitative significance of
government involvement with a charitable organization which
241Fraternal orders with incomes of less than $5,000, however, continue to be
exempt from the disclosure requirement. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033 (1971). See Hochberg &
Stein, Classificationas a PrivateFoundation Has Many Tax Ramifications, 37 J. TAXATION 88,
92 (1972); Koch, supra hote 237, at 304.
242See Eiasberg, Sec. 501(c)(3)-The Private Foundation: New ProceduralRequirements
and Noncompliance Penalties, 49 TAXEs 87, 90 (1971); Koch, supra note 237, at 304.
243 The penalty is $10 per day up to a total of $5,000. See Eliasberg, supra note 242,
at 93; Hochberg & Stein, supra note 241, at 92; Koch, supra note 237, at 305.
244 See Eliasberg, supra note 242, at 87-88.
245
246 See note 175 supra.
See text accompanying notes 85-94 supra.
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receives deductible contributions increases not only as the percentage of the organization's funds received through this avenue
expands, but also as the tax bracket of the donor becomes
higher. This result has been described as a government matching
grant system.2 47 It is worthy of note that tax exempt income for
fraternal orders includes both membership contributions and
passive investment income, but for nonprofit clubs includes only
membership contributions. 4 8 The significance of the government involvement, through the section 501(c) exemption, in
fraternal orders and nonprofit clubs may be computed by applying the otherwise applicable tax rate to the organization's tax
exempt income, and calculating what percentage the resulting
figure comprises of the organization's entire income. In most
cases, this percentage will probably constitute a significant portion of the income of the organization in question.
There can be little doubt that neither the charitable deduction provided in section 170(c) nor the exemptions to fraternal
orders and nonprofit clubs provided in section 501(c) constitute
elements of the basic minimum package of government benefits
and services distributed to a wide range of recipients.2 4 9 The
benefits of both are narrowly limited to organizations verified
with specific regard to the activities undertaken by them. While
the Court in Norwood and Nyquist remarked that a certain basic
package of services provided by the government does not impose
constitutional limitations on its recipients,2 5 ° the highly incentive,
finely tailored and narrowly distributed benefits provided by the
charitable tax incentives do not fall within this basic package.
Despite the absence of strong government approval of the
activities of the recipients of charitable tax incentives, there is a
significant degree of control and involvement in those activities.
The advantages to be derived from the charitable tax incentives
are not available on a broad scale to all private entities. This
suggests that constitutional restrictions on the recipients might
be appropriate, particularly if other elements of state action are
present.
The application of the government-objective nexus theory
developed in the preceding section 2 5' depends on whether it is
construed broadly or narrowly. That theory subjects to constitutional scrutiny only those activities pursued by the beneficiaries
of the government program for the purpose of accomplishing
the objectives which the program was intended to advance. Both
broad and narrow interpretations begin by looking at the legisla-

47

See text accompanying note 27 supra.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501(c)(7)-(8), 512(a), 513(a). See McGlotten v.

248 INT.

Connally,
338 F. Supp. 448, 458-59 (D.D.C. 1972).
249
See notes 96-97 supra & accompanying text.
250See text accompanying notes 96-103 supra.

251
See text accompanying note 118 supra.
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tive objective.25 2 With respect to the charitable tax incentives
being discussed, the only facet of a charitable organization's
activities which would be suspect under a strict reading would be
its performance of charitable duties. The membership policies of
these organizations might seemingly be too remote from the
purposes of the tax incentive to suggest constitutional limitations.
Were the theory read more broadly to include all actions in the
ordinary course of accomplishing the legislatively-favored objective the requisite nexus with membership policy would be established.
Although neither reading of the government-objective
nexus theory has been accepted by the courts, the narrow reading does provide an arguable basis for distinguishing between
discrimination by a charitable organization in its membership
policies and the discharge of its charitable functions.2 53 If such a
narrowly construed nexus theory is rejected as an insufficient
safeguard to cherished constitutional rights,2 5 4 there can be little
doubt that under any more broadly construed theory a sufficient
nexus would exist between the charitable incentive and discriminatory membership policies of the recipients of those incentives. The verification or ruling by the Service is the sine qua non
for charitable organizations,2 5 5 creating a strong bond between
the existence of the charitable organization and the aid provided
through the charitable deductions and exemption.
The effect of the countervailing vectors of privacy afforded
by the Constitution 256 must be evaluated in any comprehensive
analysis of the constitutionality of charitable tax incentives. The
most important of these in the context of charitable tax incentives is the first amendment freedom of association. The tension
between this individual freedom and the equal protection
guarantee might suggest that charitable organizations may discriminate in their membership policies, but not in the performance of the charitable duties which the incentive is designed to
foster. The Court in Norwood denied affirmative constitutional
protection to such private discrimination, at least where it is
racially motivated.2 5 7 In such a case the invidious nature of the
discrimination far outweighs the freedom of association.
Nonetheless, it is possible that less compelling constitutional
252 For a discussion of the interpretive problems to be encountered in an analysis of
the legislative intent of §§ 170(c) ana 501(c), see text accompanying notes 202-19 supra.
See sources cited notes 119-22 supra.
254 Such a theory might be accepted in most instances but discarded when an equal
protection claim involving racial discrimination is in issue. For a fuller discussion of a less
restrictive doctrine of state action in equal protection challenges, see text accompanying
notes25 158-72 supra.
n See notes 101-08 supra & accompanying text.
26 See text accompanying notes 123-41 supra.
257 93 S. Ct. 2804, 2813 (1973).
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claims might fail in the face of the freedom to associate as one
chooses.
The charitable activity which is promoted by sections 170(c)
and 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code is unquestionably a
public function.2 58 The thrust of the myriad federal, state and
local social welfare programs which flourish today is identical to
that of the charitable tax incentives-aid to those members of
society who are incapable of aiding themselves. Although at an
earlier point in time it might have been debatable whether
charity was properly a government function, since the advent of
social welfare legislation it can hardly be argued that government
is not expected to provide for those who cannot provide for
themselves. Thus, it can fairly be said that charitable tax incentives and their recipients are dedicated to public uses, which
counsels very strongly in favor of imposing constitutional restrictions upon those recipients in the performance of their public
functions.
The final element bearing upon whether granting charitable
tax incentives should activate constitutional restrictions is the
nature of the constitutional claim alleged. Certainly, it is now
probable that a lesser degree of government involvement is
necessary to activate the equal protection guarantee than is
necessary to activate either the due process guarantee or the
establishment of religion clause.2 59 Therefore, in view of the
observations made regarding the other elements of state action
in charitable tax incentives, it is suggested that racial discrimination, if proven, in either the membership policies or the charitable functions of organizations verified under section 170(a)(1) or
ruled upon pursuant to section 501(c) is unconstitutional. Despite the seeming dichotomy between the exercise of charitable
functions and membership policies suggested by consideration of
some of the elements of the constitutional framework, the invidiousness of racial discrimination and the absence of viable
countervailing factors compels the conclusion that any discrimination practiced by recipients of charitable tax incentives is
unconstitutional.
An establishment of religion claim against a religiously
affiliated charity which is the recipient of the charitable tax
incentives presently being discussed poses a slightly more
difficult problem. Due to the strong countervailing first amendment freedoms of association and of religion, and the concomitantly greater degree of involvement requisite to a finding of state
action, it seems unlikely that such a claim would succeed. Although Griffin and Nyquist have drained Walz of much of its
258 See text accompanying notes 142-57 supra.
259

See text accompanying notes 158-72 supra.
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potency in the equal protection realm 2 60 there can be little doubt
that, if it is anything but an entirely dead letter, Walz will
preclude a finding of unconstitutionality in such a situation.
Tax incentives which should not transform their recipients
into instrumentalities of the state include those related to income
security. 2 6 1 Welfare and social security programs quite clearly do
not transform the actions of their recipients into state action, and
incentives are economically equivalent to those programs. Few,
for example, would argue that a racially bigoted welfare recipient is in violation of the Constitution; it seems inconceivable
that a different result would follow as to present or future
beneficiaries under private plans because an equivalent but less
direct means was chosen to achieve the desired goal.
The deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied
homes, under section 163, should also be constitutionally unobjectionable. Government approval and control of the recipients
of this tax subsidy is minimal, and the nexus between the
government objective-home ownership by individuals-and any
equal protection claim is tenuous. As the role of the government
at the federal, state and local levels in providing adequate housing increases, perhaps the public nature of housing will predominate and tip the scales in favor of a finding of state action,
but at the present time housing for individuals remains an
essentially private matter.
Another dimension is added when encouragement of private home ownership is sought through tax incentives granted to
an intermediary, such as the mortgage lender. In very general
terms, section 593 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a
significant addition to bad debt reserves of saving and loan
associations and mutual savings banks, if a stated percentage
of their funds is invested in mortgages. This provides a subsidy which is a significant incentive to investment in home.
mortgages. 2 62 Government regulatory control is far tighter than
in the situation involving a single individual deducting his mortgage interest payments, while the effects upon society of discriminatory behavior are far more damaging. The function
2 60

See text accompanying notes 169-72 supra.

261 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§§

105 (disability insurance benefits and sick pay

exclusions), 151(c), (d) (additional exemptions for the aged and blind), 104 (exclusions
for workmen's compensation and damages received as a result of sickness or personal
inj ury), 401-04 (specialized treatment of employee pension and profit sharing plans). All
of these sections are widely available, and are arguably part of a basic minimum package
of government services and benefits. The purposes to which these subsidies are devoted
in Ihe hands of their recipients are of an essentially private nature. It is incontrovertible
that the degree of government control and approval of the recipients of these benefits is
minimal. Tberefore, there seems little doubt that these tax incentives should not impose
constitutional limitations upon their recipients.
262 For an interesting and comprehensive analysis of § 593, see D. Halperin, Federal
Income Taxation of Banks, Sept. 28, 1971 (unpublished paper presented to the 64th
Annual Conference on Taxation of the National Tax Association).
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served by these subsidized financial institutions-providing housing on a large scale-is far more public than the purchase of a
home by a single individual; countervailing vectors of privacy are
conspicuously absent. Surely these institutions should be bound
by constitutional restrictions at least in the performance of those
objectives which the legislature sought to advance through the
debt reserve incentive: granting home mortgage loans. In those
instances in which the claim is one of invidious racial discrimination, they should be bound by constitutional limitations in their
hiring policies as well.
One final example of a tax incentive which should activate
constitutional restrictions is section 167(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides accelerated five-year amortization of
expenditures for rehabilitation of low income rental housing.
This seems closely analogous to the excess bad debt reserve for
financial institutions just discussed. Most of the same, factors are
operative, and the same result should be achieved.
D. Conclusion
Tax incentives are government subsidies to private conduct
which are economically functionally equivalent to legislative provisions calculated to induce economic or social behavior in the
private sector. As such, tax incentives should be subject to the
same constitutional limitations which have traditionally been
imposed on direct government involvement with private activity,
including direct grants, loans and interest subsidies.
The task of determining whether a particular tax provision
was designed to promote social or economic behavior, or to serve
as part of a normative neutral tax structure or as an administrative convenience, is not simple. The legislative intent underlying
tax provisions is often obscure, but other considerations, such as
the arguments of proponents of the provision, retention of the
provision in the face of criticism, or the opinions of tax scholars,
may be employed to aid in characterization of the provision.
These profound definitional difficulties should not thwart the
application of constitutional restrictions to the economic subsidies conferred by those tax provisions which are unquestionably incentives to economic or social behavior.
This Comment has attempted to outline a theoretical
framework sufficient to analyze the constitutionality of tax incentives and other government subsidies. Among the elements of
government involvement with private activity which are considered are: the nature and degree of government involvement
with the otherwise private entity; the nexus between the government involvement and the challenged private activity; the
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nature of the conduct engaged in by the private entity-that is,
the "privateness" or the "publicness" of the conduct; and the
nature of the constitutional claim-that is, whether the conduct
is challenged as a violation of the equal protection guarantee, the
due process guarantee or the first amendment religion guarantees.
Through the application of this analysis to tax incentives, an
often-voiced assumption-that once tax incentives are viewed as
government subsidies economically equivalent to direct grants,
all tax incentives will impose constitutional restrictions on their
beneficiaries-has been found wanting. Just as courts have frequently declined to place constitutional restrictions on activities
undertaken by otherwise private entities receiving direct goveinment grants, they will conclude that not all tax incentives
iihipose constitutional duties upon .their recipients. A tax incentive, like a direct grant, might fail to activate constitutional
restrictions for any of the following i'easons: the absence of strict
government control over privdte activity; the lack of a public
function served by the private entity; an insufficiently direct
connection between the tax incehtive and the challenged activity;
an inadequate percentage of government involvement in the
total operating budget of the private entity; the presence of
countervailing constitutional vectors of privacy; or the absence of
an equal protection claim. Several provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code have been examined, and deemed not to require
constitutional scrutiny. Although the application of constitutional
restrictions to tax incentives must be approached cautiously, the
judiciary should take definite steps to ensure that tax provisions
will not continue to serve as indirect vehicles for "nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct."

